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Shared Interests: Promoting Healthy




While the national debate on reproductive rights has focused on a
woman's fundamental right to decide whether to have an abortion, a new
strand of legal and public policy issues recently has emerged that also
threatens American women's reproductive freedom and other fundamen-
tal liberties. During the last decade, courts, legislatures, and state prose-
cutors increasingly have sought to impose special restrictions on women
who decide to bear children. The government has attempted to use the
force of law to compel women to behave in ways deemed likely to pro-
mote the birth of healthier babies. Pregnancy-related restrictions and
penalties have been aimed at a wide variety of women's conduct, ranging
from driving an automobile' and taking prescription drugs such as an-
tibiotics and valium, 2 to drinking alcohol 3 and using illegal drugs.4
* Legal Director, National Abortion Rights Action League. B.A. 1983, J.D. 1986,
Yale University. A previous version of this Article will be published as a chapter in ABOR-
TION, MEDICINE AND THE LAW (D. Butler ed., 3d ed. forthcoming 1992). I would like to
thank the following NARAL staff and interns for their valuable research assistance, com-
ments, and other support in the writing of this Article: Jessica Blake, Jeremy Blank, Catherine
Bell Fleming, Sara Hill, Terri Lowe, Kate Michelman, Lois Eisner Murphy, Diane Prescott,
Lisa Swanson and Marcy Wilder. I am also grateful to Gene Sperling and Lynn Paltrow for
their many insightful suggestions in reviewing drafts of this Article.
1. Stallman v. Youngquist, 152 Ill. App. 3d 683, 504 N.E.2d 920 (1987) (child had a
cause of action for prenatal injuries allegedly received when her mother drove negligently
while pregnant), rev'd, 125 Ill. 2d 267, 531 N.E.2d 355 (1988); Christopher B. Daly, Woman
Charged in Death of Own Fetus in Accident, WASH. POST, Nov. 25, 1989, at A4 (woman
charged with vehicular homicide when she suffered a miscarriage after an automobile collision
allegedly resulting from her driving while intoxicated); Renee Loth, DA Sees No Politics in
Fetal Death Case, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 16, 1989, at 25 (same).
2. Grodin v. Grodin, 102 Mich. App. 396, 301 N.W.2d 869 (1980); In re J. Jeffrey, No.
99851 (Mich. Ct. App. filed Apr. 9, 1987), summarized in LEGAL DOCKET, May 1987 (ACLU
Reproductive Freedom Project), at 140.
3. Charles Levendosky, Turning Women Into 2-Legged Petri Dishes, STAR TRIB. (Cas-
per, Wyo.), Jan. 21, 1990, at AS [hereinafter Levendosky, Turning Women]; Charles
Levendosky, Using the Law to Make Justice the Victim, STAR TRIB. (Casper, Wyo.), Feb. 4,
1990, at A8 [hereinafter Levendosky, Using the Law].
4. E.g., United States v. Vaughn, 117 Daily Wash. L. Rptr. 441 (D.C. Super. Ct. Mar. 7,
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There can be no serious dispute that once a woman has chosen to
bear a child, the government has a legitimate interest in pursuing policies
that will improve the likelihood her baby will be healthy. Broad support
exists for responsible governmental initiatives aimed at reducing the
United States' tragically high infant mortality and morbidity rates. What
is at issue are the specific means employed to improve the health of chil-
dren and pregnant women: how should the government pursue this im-
portant goal?
Assessing the merits of possible governmental responses requires
close attention to the profound policy and constitutional implications of
these responses. Framing the discussion in terms of protecting the rights
and interests of the fetus, for example, tends to obscure the inescapable
reality that, physically, a fetus is part of a woman's body. Once a woman
is pregnant, the government can affect fetal development, and thus the
health of the infant at birth, only through the woman's body and actions.
This critical fact raises opportunities for the development of effective
public policies, but it also creates the potential for conflict. If not formu-
lated with care, governmental policies adopted to promote healthy births
can lead to significant and unnecessary intrusions on women's fundamen-
tal liberties and their ability to decide how to live their own lives.
During the last decade, this potential for conflict has been realized.
Legislatures, prosecutors, and courts have used many forms of coercive
governmental power to force women to act in ways deemed optimal for
fetal development. Courts have imposed civil penalties and allowed chil-
dren to sue their mothers for prenatal injuries that were attributed to the
woman's behavior while pregnant.5 Prosecutors have brought criminal
charges ranging from prenatal child neglect to homicide.6 Women have
been imprisoned and civilly committed for the duration of their
pregnancies. 7 Women have lost custody of their children because of their
1989); Johnson v. State, 578 So. 2d 419 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991), appeal docketed No. 77831
(Fla. Sup. Ct. March 6, 1992); Welch v. Kentucky, No. 90-CA-1189-MR (Ky. Ct. App. Feb.
7, 1992); Memorandum from Lynn Paltrow, Staff Counsel, ACLU Reproductive Freedom
Project et-a]., to ACLU Affiliates and Interested Parties, at I (May 7, 1987) (providing over-
view of ACLU national survey of criminal prosecutions brought against pregnant women) (on
file with the Hastings Law Journal) [hereinafter ACLU Memorandum].
5. See, e.g., Stallman, 152 Ill. App. 3d at 694, 504 N.E.2d at 927; Grodin, 102 Mich.
App. at 399, 301 N.W.2d at 870.
6. See, e.g., People v. Stewart, No. M508197 (Cal. Mun. Ct. Feb. 26, 1987); Daly, supra
note 1, at A4; Levendosky, Turning Women, supra note 3, at As; Loth, supra note 1, at 25.
7. See, eg., In re Steven S., 126 Cal. App. 3d 23, 27, 178 Cal. Rptr. 525, 526-27 (1981);
Vaughn, 117 Daily Wash. L. Rptr. 441; To Stop Abortion by Addict, Her Brother Steps In, N.Y.
TIMEs, Feb. 23, 1992, at 24.
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conduct during pregnancy. 8 And courts in eleven states have ordered
pregnant women to submit to cesarean sections against their will.9 In at
least one such case, the compelled surgery required physically tying the
woman to the operating table. 10 In another, it contributed to the wo-
man's death.11
Coercive and punitive governmental policies that create conflict be-
tween women's liberty and the promotion of healthy births are unneces-
sary. Indeed, the most effective policies for improving the health of
newborns are those that facilitate women's choices, not those that in-
fringe on their liberty. An analysis of the two dramatically different ap-
proaches taken by the government to this issue strongly supports this
conclusion. One approach, characterized by the attempts made during
the last decade to impose special restrictions and duties on women solely
because they are or may become pregnant, can be described as the "ad-
versarial model." Adversarial policies approach the woman and the fe-
tus she carries as distinct legal entities having adverse interests, and
assume that the government's role is to protect the fetus from the
woman.
The second approach, which historically has been and today re-
mains far more common, can be described as the "facilitative model."
This model recognizes that women who bear children share the govern-
ment's objective of promoting healthy births, but that existing obsta-
cles-and not bad intentions-impede the attainment of this common
goal. Women inevitably must make numerous decisions that require
them to balance varying and uncertain risks to fetal development against
competing demands and interests in their lives. Rather than depriving
women of the right to make these judgments or punishing women after
the fact for making "wrong" choices, facilitative policies seek to expand
women's choices by, for example, improving access to prenatal care,
food, shelter, and treatment for drug and alcohol dependency.
This Article explores the relative merits of the facilitative and adver-
sarial models of governmental action. It concludes that the approach
8. Levendosky, Turning Women, supra note 3, at A8; Levendosky, Using the Law, supra
note 3, at A8.
9. Veronica E.B. Kolder et al., Court-Ordered Obstetrical Interventions, 316 NEw ENG.
J. MED. 1192, 1194 (1987); see, ag., In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235 (D.C. 1990) (en bane); Jefferson
v. Griffin Spalding County Hosp. Auth., 247 Ga. 86, 88, 274 S.E.2d 457, 459-60 (1981) (per
curiam).
10. Janet Gallagher, Prenatal Invasions and Interventions: What's Wrong with Fetal
Rights, 10 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 9, 10 (1987) (quoting Veronica E.B. Kolder, Women's Health
Law: A Feminist Perspective, 1-2 (Aug. 1985) (unpublished manuscript on file with the
Harvard Women's Law Journal)).
11. See In re A.C., 573 A.2d at 1235.
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that best preserves women's liberty interests is also the most effective at
promoting healthy pregnancies. The facilitative approach-building on
shared goals-offers opportunities for positive, effective, and cost-effi-
cient governmental policies. By contrast, the adversarial approach--cre-
ating maternal-fetal conflicts-is not only ineffective, but often disserves
the governmental objective of promoting healthy births.
Part II of the Article describes the facilitative and adversarial mod-
els in more detail, focusing on how their underlying rationales and gen-
eral effects differ. Part III then briefly reviews the history of the legal
status of the fetus, revealing that use of the adversarial model is not sup-
ported by legal precedent. Part IV explores the ways in which govern-
mental action premised on the adversarial model threatens women's
fundamental liberties, including their rights to privacy and bodily integ-
rity, as protected by the United States Constitution and state constitu-
tions. This exploration shows that absent constitutional limitations on
the government's use of criminal and civil sanctions to force women to
act in the perceived best interests of fetal development, the government
would have a justification for exerting unprecedented, sweeping control
over women's lives. Part IV then examines in detail the four major types
of coercive action employed under the adversarial model, showing that
each fails strict judicial scrutiny because the resulting infringements on
women's fundamental liberties are not justified by the government's
countervailing concerns. Adversarial policies do not further their as-
serted purpose and often affect women's behavior in ways actually harm-
ful to fetal development and to the women themselves. Even if rare
instances exist in which an adversarial approach might improve the like-
lihood of a healthy birth in a specific case, many more women will be
deterred from obtaining health care and drug and alcohol treatment by
fear of prosecution, incarceration, civil liability, and court-ordered sur-
gery. Citing these negative effects, and often noting the possibility of
facilitative alternatives, a wide range of organizations have opposed gov-
ernmental attempts to impose special restrictions on pregnant or fertile
women.12
12. The American Medical Association (AMA) is among the medical organizations to
oppose the use of adversarial policies. See Board of Trustees, Am. Medical Ass'n, Legal Inter-
ventions During Pregnancy: Court-Ordered Medical Treatments and Legal Penalties for Poten-
tially Harmful Behavior by Pregnant Women, 264 JAMA 2663 (1990) (adopted by the AMA
House of Delegates) [hereinafter AMA, Legal Interventions During Pregnancy]; Am. Medical
Ass'n, Treatment Versus Criminalization: Physician Role in Drug Addiction During Pregnancy,
Resolution 131 (1990) (adopted by the AMA House of Delegates) [hereinafter AMA, Treat-
ment Versus Criminalization]; see also Board of Trustees, Am. Medical Ass'n, Drug Abuse in
the United States: The Next Generation 12 (1989) (adopted by the AMA House of Delegates)
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Finally, Part V briefly discusses how the use of adversarial policies
runs counter to the value of equality embodied in federal and state con-
stitutional protections against discrimination on the basis of sex or race.
Adversarial policies employed to date have focused exclusively on re-
stricting women's behavior, even though ample evidence exists that men
can adversely affect fetal development through behavior that results in
damage to sperm, including smoking, drinking alcohol, drug use, and
working in jobs that involve exposure to certain substances, such as lead.
Serious concerns of racial injustice also are raised by the government's
use of adversarial policies. Recent studies show that African American
women and other women of color have, in vastly disproportionate num-
bers, been the targets of pregnancy-related criminal prosecutions and
court-ordered surgeries. In addition to providing the basis for possible
legal challenges, these equality concerns provide strong support for the
powerful policy arguments against governmental action that follows the
adversarial model.
II. Two Models of Governmental Action to Promote Maternal
and Infant Health
A. The Facilitative Model
The core assumption underlying policies that follow the facilitative
model is that the critical goal of improving maternal and infant health
can best be achieved by building on the shared interests of women and
the government. The facilitative model is premised on the view that wo-
men who decide to bear children wish to have healthy pregnancies and
healthy babies and typically will go to great lengths to make this possible.
In a statement opposing legal interference with women's decisions during
pregnancy, the American Medical Association's Board of Trustees noted:
Ordinarily, the pregnant woman, in consultation with her physician,
acts in all reasonable ways to enhance the health of her fetus. Indeed,
clinicians are frequently impressed with the amount of personal health
[hereinafter AMA, Drug Abuse in the United States]. The American College of Obstetricians
and Gynecologists (ACOG) also opposes adversarial policies. See Comm. on Ethics, Am. Col-
lege of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, ACOG Comm. Op., No. 55 Patient Choice: Maternal-
Fetal Conflict 2 (Oct. 1987) [hereinafter ACOG Committee Opinion]. At least one children's
interests organization has opposed such policies. See NAT'L ASS'N OF PUB. CHILD WELFARE
ADM'RS, GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR WORKING WITH SUBSTANCE-ABUSING FAMILIES AND
DRUG-EXPOSED CHILDREN: THE CHILD WELFARE RESPONSE 3 (approved Jan. 1991). Not
surprisingly, individual rights watchdog organizations have adopted a similar stance. See Co-
ALITION ON ALCOHOL AND DRUG DEPENDENT WOMEN AND THEIR CHILDREN, STATE-
MENT OPPOSING PROSECUTION (Dec. 1990) (statement joined by over 20 organizations,
including the National Abortion Rights Action League and the American Civil Liberties
Union).
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risk undertaken and voluntary self-restraint exhibited by the pregnant
woman for the sake of her fetus and to help ensure that her child will
be as healthy as possible. 13
Rather than creating conflicts by transforming the sacrifices and choices
some women voluntarily make for the sake of the fetus into legally re-
quired standards of conduct for all women in all circumstances, facilita-
tive policies support women's ability to make individual decisions that
promote healthy births.
Basic to the facilitative model is an understanding that women do
not-indeed, could not-focus their every decision and action toward the
sole goal of reducing any risk to fetal development in a current or future
pregnancy. The unavoidable fact is that women must make countless
decisions that to varying degrees affect the likelihood of optimal fetal
development. Women must daily weigh these risks against competing
demands and desires: to care for their children and other family mem-
bers, to continue working in their jobs. How a particular woman's vari-
ous decisions will combine to affect fetal development is far from certain.
The facilitative model assumes that each woman-and not the govern-
ment-is best situated ultimately to decide how to balance these compet-
ing risks and moral considerations.
The facilitative model acknowledges that many women face obsta-
cles to having the healthy pregnancies they desire. Such obstacles may
include illness, addiction, poor information, lack of health insurance, and
poverty. For example, one third of pregnant women in the United
States, or about three million pregnant women each year, currently do
not receive adequate prenatal care, a circumstance closely linked to in-
fant mortality and poor infant health. 14 Government policies that pro-
vide a woman with the tools necessary to have the healthy pregnancy she
desires facilitate achievement of this common goal.
Facilitative policies need not be costly and, indeed, can save the gov-
ernment money, given the high costs associated with poor infant health.
An example of an existing cost effective program that takes a facilitative
approach is the Special Supplemental Food Program for Women, In-
fants, and Children (WIC), which provides food supplementation, nutri-
tion education, and health care and social services referrals to low
income women, infants, and children. In operation since 1974, the WIC
program is universally recognized as highly successful in reducing the
13. AMA, Legal Interventions During Pregnancy, supra note 12, at 2663; see also ACOG
Committee Opinion, supra note 12, at 2 ("The vast majority of pregnant women are willing to
assume significant risk for the welfare of the fetus.").
14. Panel Urges a Consolidation of Prenatal Care, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 24, 1991, at A21
(citing study of National Commission to Prevent Infant Mortality).
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incidence of low birthweight, infant mortality and other infant health
problems. Yet the program is currently funded to allow only about half,
or 4.5 million of the income-eligible women and children to participate.1 5
The WIC program is so successful in improving infant health that ex-
panding funding for it would actually save the government a substantial
amount of money in health assistance to low income women and chil-
dren. A recent study by the United States Department of Agriculture
found that in just the first sixty days after birth, each dollar spent on the
WIC program results in reduced Medicaid costs of between $1.77 and
$3.13.16 An analysis published by the National Bureau of Economic Re-
search found that expenditures to improve prenatal care would be even
more cost effective than WIC.17
The facilitative model accommodates the reality that some women
engage in behavior that both presents a relatively high risk of harm to
fetal development and also is viewed by society as having little or no
redeeming value. A woman who, for example, ingests large amounts of
alcohol or cocaine throughout pregnancy clearly is in no sense making a
"good" decision. Even in these instances, however, a facilitative ap-
proach is most effective. The overwhelming majority of women who use
substances such as cocaine, alcohol, and tobacco during pregnancy do so
because they suffer from strong physical and psychological dependencies
developed prior to pregnancy, not because they desire to give birth to an
unhealthy baby. In fact, providers of health care and drug and alcohol
treatment find that women are highly motivated during pregnancy to
seek help in overcoming their dependencies precisely because they want
to minimize risks to fetal development and deliver healthy babies.18 The
15. Spencer Rich, Focusing on Food Stamps for Low-Income Children, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
23, 1991, at A15.
16. CENTER ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES, GEORGE GRAHAM'S CRITIQUE OF
THE WIC PROGRAM 4 (Apr. 1991) [hereinafter GEORGE GRAHAM'S CRITIQUE]; CENTER ON
BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES, WIC: A WINNING STRATEGY FOR MATERNAL AND
CHILD HEALTH (Jan. 1, 1990); OFFICE OF ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION, U.S. DEP'T OF AG-
RICULTURE, THE SAVINGS IN MEDICAID COSTS FOR NEWBORNS AND THEIR MOTHERS
FROM PRENATAL PARTICIPATION IN THE WIC PROGRAM xii (1990); Spencer Rich, Mothers'
Nutrition Program Is Effective, U.S. Study Finds, WASH. POST, Oct. 19, 1990, at A21.
17. THEODORE JOYCE ET AL., A COST-EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS OF STRATEGIES TO
REDUCE INFANT MORTALITY (Nat'l Bureau of Economic Research, 1988), cited in GEORGE
GRAHAM'S CRITIQUE, supra note 16, at 10 n.4; see also SOCIAL SERVS. PROGRAM, NAT'L
GOVERNORS' ASS'N, NGA National Forum on Prevention Programs for Children, NGA IN
BRIEF (Nat'l Governors Ass'n/Social Servs. Program, Washington, D.C.), Sept. 21, 1990, at 1
(A study of North Carolina's program of expanded prenatal care services to Medicaid recipi-
ents disclosed that "the state Medicaid program saves an estimated $2.44 in newborn medical
costs for each $1.00 spent for care coordination.") [hereinafter NGA, IN BRIEF]; U.S. DEP'T
OF AGRICULTURE, supra note 16, at xiii.
18. See, e.g., NGA, IN BRIEF, supra note 17, at 2 ("Pregnancy is a motivating factor for
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use of punitive adversarial approaches, by contrast, merely deters women
from seeking necessary treatment and prenatal care by instilling fear of
prosecution and thus runs counter to efforts to promote healthy births.19
Despite the great need and demand for treatment for pregnant drug
and alcohol dependent women, the vast majority of pregnant women
seeking treatment find it impossible to obtain. Drug treatment programs
routinely deny admission to pregnant women, and the few that will treat
women during pregnancy typically have long waiting lists.2° Facilitative
approaches focus on filling this clear need for treatment, and also seek to
prevent people from forming dangerous dependencies in the first place,
through, for example, public education about the harmful effects of drug
and alcohol use by women during pregnancy. Prevention programs are
also valuable in that they make it possible to target men for education
about the risk of damage to sperm from alcohol and drug use, which can
result in fetal harm.21
B. The Adversarial Model
Though most governmental responses to problems of poor infant
health are still premised on the facilitative model, during the last decade
governmental entities have increasingly employed approaches premised
on the adversarial model. Under this model, a pregnant woman is
viewed as two distinct entities-woman and fetus-each with separate
and conflicting interests. Each of the countless decisions a woman makes
that could affect fetal development is viewed with suspicion. The govern-
ment's role is to protect the fetus from the pregnant woman by using the
law to compel her to act in ways that a court, legislature, physician, or
other appointed third party deems optimal for fetal health. Specifically,
the government seeks to control women's behavior by second guessing
their decisions and subjecting them to special restrictions and obligations
based solely on the fact that they currently are or may become pregnant.
In recent years, courts, legislatures, prosecutors, and other govern-
mental entities have used adversarial approaches to police women's be-
havior with respect to a broad range of activities. Most sweeping have
been attempts to define the fetus as a distinct legal "person" and then
force women to comply with legally required standards of behavior that
most women to seek treatment because of concern for their soon to be born child."); AMA,
Legal Interventions During Pregnancy, supra note 12, at 2668; AMA, Drug Abuse in the United
States, supra note 12, at 12.
19. See infra notes 145-153 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 158-162 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 171-173 and accompanying text.
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are broadly and vaguely defined. 22 In one of the first instances of an
adversarial approach, a Michigan appellate court ruled in 1980 that a
child could sue his mother for prenatal injuries if she had failed to act, in
the eyes of a court, as a "reasonable" pregnant woman. 23 In that case,
the child alleged his mother's negligent use during pregnancy of the an-
tibiotic tetracycline caused him to be born with discolored teeth. In
1987, an Illinois appellate court-ultimately reversed by the Illinois
Supreme Court-similarly allowed a girl to sue her mother for intestinal
injuries allegedly caused prenatally by her mother's involvement in an
automobile accident while pregnant.24
Women have also been criminally prosecuted under general child
abuse statutes for "prenatal abuse" of their fetuses on the basis of their
behavior during pregnancy. A California woman was criminally prose-
cuted in the 1986 case, People v. Stewart,25 for allegedly causing her in-
fant son's severe brain damage and ultimate death, which resulted from
her own loss of blood during delivery. The woman was prosecuted under
a statute requiring parents to provide their children with clothing, food,
shelter, and medical attendance,2 6 the prosecution claiming that the wo-
man could have avoided this tragedy by following her doctor's advice
and seeking medical care as soon as she began bleeding vaginally, rather
than waiting several hours. Ultimately, the judge ruled that the statute
could not be used to prosecute a woman for her otherwise lawful behav-
ior during pregnancy. 27 Since the Stewart case, prosecutors across the
country have attempted to prosecute women under statutes that clearly
never were intended to criminalize women's conduct during pregnancy.
A pregnant woman in Wyoming who went to a police station to report
that her husband had physically assaulted her was herself arrested and
charged with child abuse for drinking alcohol during pregnancy. 28 A
woman in Massachusetts who suffered serious injuries in a car accident,
22. Numerous bills have been introduced in Congress and in state legislatures since Roe
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), that would grant fetuses sweeping rights as "persons" either
through statute or amendment to the United States Constitution. See generally NAT'L ABOR-
TION RIGHTS ACTION LEAGUE, WHO DECIDES? A STATE-BY-STATE REVIEW OF ABORTION
RIGHTS 1992 (Jan. 1992) (comprehensive study summarizing all bills introduced in state legis-
latures in 1991 that would affect reproductive rights).
23. Grodin v. Grodin, 102 Mich. App. 396, 401, 301 N.W.2d 869, 870-71 (1980).
24. Stallman v. Youngquist, 152 Ill. App. 3d 683, 694, 504 N.E.2d 920, 927 (1987), rev'd,
125 Ill. 2d 267, 531 N.E.2d 355 (1988).
25. People v. Stewart, No. M508197 (Cal. Mun. Ct. Feb. 26, 1987).
26. Id. at 3 (citing CAL. PENAL CODE § 270 (West 1988)).
27. Id. at 10.
28. Levendosky, Turning Women, supra note 3, at AS; Levendosky, Using the Law, supra
note 3, at A8.
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including the loss of her pregnancy, was prosecuted for involuntary man-
slaughter because she allegedly caused the accident by driving while
intoxicated. 29
In another application of the adversarial model, judges have overrid-
den women's decisions regarding medical treatment and at least eleven
states and the District of Columbia have ordered women to give birth by
cesarean section, rather than vaginal delivery, despite the increased medi-
cal risks and severe bodily intrusion involved. 30 The District of Colum-
bia Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, recently became the first appellate
court to fully address the constitutional implications of this unprece-
dented interference with an individual's bodily integrity and ruled in
1990 that a court order forcing a woman to submit to a cesarean section
violates her constitutional rights. 31
In addition to civil and criminal prosecutions and court-ordered
medical interventions, states have attempted to deprive women of cus-
tody of their children based solely on their actions during pregnancy,
rather than making the customary determination based on the current
ability of the woman and other family members to care for the child. A
Michigan woman was charged in 1987 with child abuse and temporarily
lost custody of her infant because she had taken valium while pregnant to
relieve pain from injuries suffered in a car accident. 32 A woman in Iowa
similarly lost custody of her son after being charged with prenatal child
abuse based solely on her conduct during pregnancy.33 Although the
Iowa prosecution was based in part on allegations the woman used illegal
drugs, the frightening breadth of conduct for which women could be
prosecuted is suggested by the fact that the testimony against her in-
cluded allegations that she "paid no attention to the nutritional value of
the food she ate during her pregnancy-she simply picked the foods that
tasted good to her without considering whether they were good for her
unborn child."'34
Thus far, the adversarial model has been used most frequently in
cases involving the use of illegal substances by pregnant women. Obvi-
29. See Daly, supra note 1, at A4; Loth, supra note 1, at 25.
30. Kolder et al., supra note 9, at 1194; In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235 (D.C. 1990) (en bane);
Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hosp. Auth., 274 Ga. 86, 274 S.E.2d 457 (1981) (per
curiam).
31. In re A.C., 573 A.2d at 1247.
32. In re J. Jeffrey, No. 99851 (Mich. Ct. App. filed Apr. 9, 1987), summarized in LEGAL
DOCKET, supra note 2, at 140.
33. Baby Placed in Foster Home: Doctor Claims Prenatal Abuse, DES MOINES REG.,
Apr. 3, 1980, at 1 lA [hereinafter Baby Placed in Foster Home].
34. Id. at 11A.
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ously, a woman's pregnant status does not immunize her from prosecu-
tion under a generally applicable criminal statute that would otherwise
prohibit her behavior. In the dozens of cases that have followed the ad-
versarial model, however, women have been singled out for special prose-
cutions and additional penalties solely because they were pregnant at the
time of the drug use. Prosecutors bringing such actions have relied upon
statutes that were never intended to be used in this manner and that
impose harsher penalties than those for simple possession.35 In a related
context, a Washington, D.C. court ordered a woman imprisoned for the
duration of her pregnancy following her arrest for forging checks. 36
Although the prosecutor recommended probation, the judge sentenced
the woman to imprisonment for 180 days-sufficient time to ensure she
would give birth in jail-because she had tested positive for cocaine use,
and the judge wanted to prevent her from using cocaine again while
pregnant. 37
III. The Lack of Precedent for the Adversarial Model
The adversarial approach has been defended as following a general
trend in the law toward recognition of the fetus as a legal entity or "per-
son" distinct from the pregnant woman. This description of the law is
simplistic and misleading. In fact, prior to the very recent trend toward
the adversarial approach, the law viewed the pregnant woman as a single
legal entity and did not treat the fetus as her legal adversary.3 8 As the
United States Supreme Court stated in Roe v. Wade,3 9 "the unborn have
never been recognized in the law as persons in the whole sense" 4 and
have not been recognized at all "except in narrowly defined situations
and except when the rights are contingent upon live birth.' 41
Over the years, the law has developed to take the existence of the
fetus into account under certain circumstances, but this has occurred
only for specific narrow purposes that promote the interests of born peo-
ple, including women who bear children. Recognition of the fetus as a
35. See, eg., Johnson v. State, 578 So. 2d 419 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991), appeal docketed
No. 77831 (Fla. Sup. Ct. March 6, 1992).
36. United States v. Vaughn, 117 Daily Wash. L. Rptr. 441 (D.C. Super. Ct. 1989).
37. Id.
38. For a more extensive discussion of the legal status of the fetus, see Dawn E. Johnsen,
Note, The Creation of Fetal Rights: Conflicts with Women's Constitutional Rights to Liberty,
Privacy, and Equal Protection, 95 YALE L.J. 599, 600-13 (1986).
39. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
40. Id. at 162.
41. Id. at 161.
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legal "person" in these instances in no way supports the notion that there
are fetal interests assertable by the government or others against women.
The first context in which the definition of a legal "person" was ex-
panded to include a fetus occurred in property law during the late nine-
teenth century. The law presumed that a man would desire to include
among his heirs a child of his who was conceived yet not born at the time
of his death.42 Legal status was conferred to protect not fetal interests,
but the interests of a deceased parent, and was contingent upon the
child's subsequent live birth.43
Tort law also developed to recognize the existence of the fetus. In
1946, a court first held that a child may maintain a cause of action
against a third party, such as a physician, whose tortious conduct toward
a pregnant woman results in the subsequently born child suffering
harm.44 Allowing recovery for such prenatal injuries furthers the inter-
ests of women who bear children without creating maternal-fetal con-
flicts. It serves to compensate children for injuries suffered and helps pay
the costs associated with their care. It also serves to deter wrongful acts
toward pregnant women that cause such injuries.
Some states have subsequently extended the law's recognition of the
fetus as a legal entity for certain purposes under criminal and civil law
without the traditional requirement of a subsequent live birth.45 Again,
this development did not create maternal-fetal conflicts but actually
42. See, e.g., Cowles v. Cowles, 56 Conn. 240, 13 A. 414 (1887); Medlock v. Brown, 163
Ga. 520, 136 S.E. 551 (1927); McLain v. Howald, 120 Mich. 274, 79 N.W. 182 (1899); see also
Christian v. Carter, 193 N.C. 537, 538, 137 S.E. 596, 597 (1927) (stating that the civil law rule
as to the recognition of fetuses "apparently was based upon the presumed oversight or inadver-
tence of the parent in providing for an existing or a contingent situation"). Even within prop-
erty law, recognition of the fetus is the exception rather than the rule. See, e.g., In re Peabody,
5 N.Y.2d 541, 158 N.E.2d 841, 186 N.Y.S.2d 265 (1959) (holding that a fetus is not a person
"beneficially interested" for purposes of § 23 of New York's Personal Property Law and distin-
guishing the limited purposes served by the "fiction" of considering a fetus subsequently born
alive a person for certain other matters of property law).
43. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 161-62; sources cited supra note 42.
44. See Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138, 140 (D.D.C. 1946) (first case to recognize
standing of a child to maintain a cause of action for injuries received in utero after viability).
45. In some cases, state courts have stated explicitly that the purpose behind recognizing
this cause of action is to compensate parents. See Volk v. Baldazo, 103 Idaho 570, 574, 651
P.2d 11, 15 (1982) (wrongful death statute "confers upon parents a cause of action for the
wrongful death of a 'child' and thus protects the rights and interests of the parents, and not
those of the decedent child"); Dunn v. Rose Way, Inc., 333 N.W. 2d 830, 832-33 (Iowa 1983)
(distinguishing between claim by estate of fetus under state's survival statute in which "the
wrong is done to the injured person and to that person's estate," and a claim by parents for loss
of a fetus under a wrongful death statute in which "the wrong is done to a child's parents,"
and concluding that the wrongful death statute, "involved ... a right of recovery given to a
parent. The parent's loss does not depend on the legal status of the child .... "). Other state
courts, however, have relied on a general state interest in protecting life. See Danos v. St.
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served to further women's interests. As courts have explicitly noted,
when a woman is caused to suffer a miscarriage or a stillbirth, allowing a
civil cause of action for wrongful death or a criminal prosecution for
homicide serves to protect pregnant women from severe bodily intrusion,
physical harm, and the involuntary termination of pregnancies. For ex-
ample, the United States Supreme Court has described wrongful death
actions for the destruction of a fetus as providing compensation for the
loss of a future wanted child:
[S]ome States permit the parents of a stillborn child to maintain an
action for wrongful death because of prenatal injuries. Such an action,
however, would appear to be one to vindicate the parents' interest and
is thus consistent with the view that the fetus, at most, represents only
the potentiality of life.46
Thus, legal precedent does not support the adversarial approach to pro-
moting maternal and fetal health. Traditionally, the law did not treat the
fetus as a separate entity in contexts that would create an adversarial
relationship between a pregnant woman and the fetus within her.
Rather, the law recognized the fetus as a legal entity only for carefully
defined purposes, with a view toward protecting and promoting the inter-
ests of women as well as their children.
IV. Constitutional Limitations on the Adversarial Model
A. Women's Fundamental Rights
Governmental action based on the adversarial model is not only a
sharp deviation from precedent, it also is at odds with the United States
Constitution. Subjecting women to special restrictions because of their
childbearing capability interferes with rights the Constitution recognizes
as so fundamental to individual liberty that they may be restricted by the
government only under the most compelling circumstances. Adversarial
policies must therefore satisfy the demanding strict scrutiny standard of
judicial review.
Because the government's use of the adversarial approach is rela-
tively new and still atypical, no federal court has had occasion to con-
sider its implications for women's constitutional rights. As discussed
below, several state courts have examined the constitutionality of specific
Pierre, 402 So. 2d 633, 638 (La. 1981) (citing legislative pronouncement that "a human being
exists from the moment of fertilization and implantation").
Although most states that have used the criminal law in this manner have done so by
amending the state homicide law to extend to fetuses, at least one state explicitly focused the
law's protection on the pregnant woman rather than the fetus. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-3-7
(Supp. 1989).
46. Roe, 410 U.S. at 162 (citation omitted).
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adversarial actions-including court-ordered cesarean sections and crim-
inal prosecutions of women for being pregnant while using illegal
drugs-and have found that they interfere with women's fundamental
rights, as protected by the guarantee of liberty contained in the Four-
teenth Amendment.47 Opinions of the United States Supreme Court rec-
ognizing and protecting fundamental liberties support these state court
rulings.
Among the aspects of liberty that the Supreme Court has found to
be fundamental, and thus deserving of heightened judicial protection, is
the individual's right to "independence in making certain kinds of impor-
tant decisions,"' 48 particularly in matters central to determining the
course of his or her own life. The Court has used various terms to de-
scribe rights related to decision-making autonomy, most often referring
to them as part of the "right to privacy." The Court has identified deci-
sions related to procreation and pregnancy as being "at the very heart" of
the right to privacy.49 Also fundamental is the individual's right to pri-
vacy in certain matters that concern his or her physical body, which has
been described as the right to bodily integrity.50 As the Court recently
noted, this principle of bodily integrity is deeply embedded in our com-
mon law:
Before the turn of the century, this Court observed that "[n]o right is
held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law,
than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his
own person, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by
clear and unquestionable authority of law. 51
47. See infra section IV.B.
48. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977).
49. "The decision whether or not to beget or bear a child is at the very heart of this
cluster of constitutionally protected choices." Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678,
685 (1977). This cluster includes the right of the individual: to choose to prevent pregnancy
through contraception, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); to terminate a preg-
nancy through abortion, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); to continue working throughout
pregnancy, Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974); and to remain fertile,
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). The Court has described the fundamental right to
privacy as including "the right of the individual... to be free from unwarranted governmental
intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or
beget a child." Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
50. For example, citing a Fourth Amendment right to "personal privacy and bodily in-
tegrity," the Supreme Court ruled that a state could not compel a criminal defendant to submit
to the surgical removal of a bullet needed as evidence in the state's prosecution. Winston v.
Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 761 (1985). In an earlier decision, the Court overturned as violative of the
Fourteenth Amendment a conviction based on evidence obtained from what the Court de-
scribed as a bodily invasion that "shocks the conscience," consisting of the forced stomach
pumping of a criminal suspect. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952).
51. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2846 (1990) (quoting
Union Pacific R.R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891)).
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Policies based on the adversarial model infringe on these fundamen-
tal liberties to a greater extent than analogous governmental interferences
that courts have found unconstitutional. This is most graphically illus-
trated by the cases in which women have been forced against their will to
submit to cesarean sections. The bodily intrusion entailed in such a
case-with the attendant risks of major surgery (such as the risk of infec-
tion from the incision and a higher mortality rate)-surpasses those the
Court has found unconstitutional in cases involving criminal defendants,
over whom the government generally may exercise unusually far reach-
ing control.5 2  In one reported case, carrying out the court-ordered
cesarean section required physically tying the woman to the hospital bed
and forcibly removing her husband from the room.53 The bodily intru-
sion inflicted by ordering women to undergo cesarean sections for the
advancement of perceived fetal interests stands in sharp contrast to our
legal system's typical refusal to force one person to help another, even
when doing so would save the other from grave injury or certain death
with little or no personal sacrifice or risk.54
Although recent appointments to the United States Supreme Court
threaten to alter the Court's fundamental rights jurisprudence, and in
particular to remove constitutional protection from the fundamental
right of a woman to decide whether to have an abortion,5 5 the Court
52. See supra note 50.
53. Confronted with the doctor's intentions, the woman and her husband became
irate. The husband was asked to leave, refused, and was forcedly removed from the
hospital by seven security officers. The woman became combative and was placed in
full leathers, a term that refers to leather wrist and ankle cuffs that are attached to
the four corners of a bed to prevent the patient from moving. Despite her restraints,
the woman continued to scream for help and bit through her intravenous tubing in
an attempt to get free.
Gallagher, supra note 10, at 10.
54. Attempts by the government to force an individual to assist another are rare. Courts
have held that people have no obligation to assist. Particularly instructive is McFall v. Shimp,
10 Pa. D. & C.3d 90, 91 (Allegheny Cty. 1978) (per curiam) (reprinted in 127 PrrrsBURGH
LEGAL J. 14 (1979)), in which a court ruled that a man could not be compelled to donate bone
marrow necessary to save the life of his cousin. The court wrote:
The common law has consistently held to a rule which provides that one human
being is under no legal compulsion to give aid or to take action to save another
human being or to rescue .... For our law to compel defendant to submit to an
intrusion of his body would change every concept and principle upon which our
society is founded. To do so would defeat the sanctity of the individual, . . . and one
could not imagine where the line would be drawn.
Id. at 91 (emphasis in original); see also In re Pescinski, 67 Wis. 2d 4, 8-9, 226 N.W.2d 180,
182 (1975) (court found it had no authority to order kidney transplant from incompetent men-
tally ill individual to his sister in dire need of transplant "[i]n the absence of real consent on his
part, and in a situation where no benefit to him has been established").
55. See Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989) (state ban on use of
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nonetheless might find that adversarial policies directed at women who
choose to bear children interfere impermissibly with women's fundamen-
tal constitutional rights. Even staunch opponents of Roe v. Wade have
stated that the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of liberty protects
individuals from physical intrusions such as being forced to undergo un-
wanted medical procedures. For example, arguing on behalf of the Bush
Administration that the Supreme Court should overrule Roe v. Wade
and hold that women do not possess a fundamental right to make their
own decisions regarding abortion, Solicitor General Kenneth Starr
sought to distinguish forced abortions as nonetheless unconstitutional:
"A state law mandating abortions would present a starkly different ques-
tion. Our Nation's history and traditions establish that a competent
adult may generally refuse unwanted medical intrusion. This right
would, we believe, extend to an unwanted abortion.15 6 This view seem-
ingly would protect a woman from a court-ordered cesarean section or
other "unwanted medical intrusion."
In addition to the protection afforded by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's guarantee of liberty, state constitutional guarantees of liberty and
privacy may provide women with protection from the intrusions of ad-
public employees and facilities for performance or assistance of nontherapeutic abortions was
not unconstitutional); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 60 U.S.L.W. 3388 (1992) (U.S. Supreme
Court granted certiorari to determine the constitutionality of the Pennsylvania Abortion Con-
trol Act). Constitutional provisions that protect women from sex discrimination may also
constrain the use of adversarial policies. See infra section V.A.
56. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 14 n.7, Hodgson v. Minnesota, 110 S.
Ct. 2926 (1990) (Nos. 88-1309, 88-1125). During oral argument in Webster v. Reproductive
Health Services, then-Solicitor General Charles Fried similarly conceded that a forced abortion
would be unconstitutional:
Justice O'Connor: Do you think the state has the right to, if in a future century we
had a serious overpopulation problem, has a right to require
women to have abortions after so many children?
Mr. Fried: I surely do not. That would be a different matter.
Justice O'Connor: What do you rest that on?
Mr. Fried: Because unlike abortion, which involves the purposeful termina-
tion of future life, that would involve not preventing an opera-
tion but violently taking hands on, laying hands on a woman and
submitting her to an operation and a whole constellation-
Justice O'Connor: And you would rest that on substantive due process protection?
Mr. Fried: Absolutely.
Transcript of Arguments Before Court on Abortion Case, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 1989, at B12,
B13.
Both Fried and Starr failed to recognize that compelled pregnancy and childbirth also
involve the government "violently taking hands on, laying hands on a woman," inconsistent
with "[o]ur Nation's history and traditions." Nonetheless, their recognition that a woman's
fundamental rights would be implicated by "laying hands on a woman and submitting her to
an operation" or an "unwanted medical intrusion" applies directly to forcing a woman to
submit to a cesarean section.
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versarial policies. State courts are free to interpret state constitutional
provisions as more protective of individual liberties than similar provi-
sions of the federal constitution. State courts have, for example, inter-
preted privacy provisions in their state constitutions as more protective
than the federal constitution of women's right to make their own deci-
sions regarding abortion, and on that basis have invalidated restrictions
on minors' ability to obtain abortions without parental consent.5 7 Dis-
criminatory restrictions on funding for abortion have been struck down
on similar grounds.5 8
If courts fail to apply strict scrutiny to adversarial policies, the gov-
ernment will be free to override or penalize any decision by a woman
upon a simple showing that the regulation is rationally related to a legiti-
mate interest in reducing a risk to fetal development.5 9 Because the fetus
is physically part of a woman's body, a multitude of actions by pregnant
women could be viewed as presenting some risk-however small and
speculative-to fetal development. Governmental entities have already
sought to impose on women criminal and civil penalties-including im-
prisonment, civil commitment, court-ordered surgery, and the loss of
custody of their children-for a broad range of behaviors during preg-
nancy that present some risk to fetal development, such as failing to ob-
tain adequate medical care,6° not following a doctor's advice,61 failing to
eat a balanced diet,62 smoking cigarettes,63 choosing vaginal delivery
over cesarean section," engaging in sexual intercourse with a spouse,65
57. American Academy of Pediatrics v. Van de Kamp, 214 Cal. App. 3d 831, 836, 263
Cal. Rptr. 46, 49-52 (1989) (issuance of preliminary injunction to prevent implementation of a
parental consent statute upheld under California Constitution); In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186,
1192-93 (Fla. 1989) (Florida statute requiring parental consent for a minor's abortion held
invalid under the Florida Constitution).
58. See, e.g., Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers, 29 Cal. 3d 252, 285,
625 P.2d 779, 799, 172 Cal. Rptr. 866, 886 (1981) (statutory provisions limiting Medi-Cal
funding for abortions held invalid under California Constitution); Doe v. Director of Dep't of
Social Servs., 187 Mich. App. 493, 508, 468 N.W.2d 862, 869 (1991) (prohibition on the use of
Medicaid funds for any abortion not necessary to save the life of the mother held violative of
Michigan Constitution).
59. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1439-43 (2d ed.
1988).
60. See Reyes v. Superior Court, 75 Cal. App. 3d 214, 217, 141 Cal. Rptr. 912, 913
(1977); Baby Placed in Foster Home, supra note 33, at 1 lA.
61. People v. Stewart, No. M508197, slip. op. at 4 (Cal. Mun. Ct. Feb 26, 1987).
62. Baby Placed in Foster Home, supra note 33, at 11A.
63. Id.
64. E.g., In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1252 (D.C. 1990) (en bane); Jefferson v. Griffin
Spalding County Hosp. Auth., 247 Ga. 86, 88, 274 S.E.2d 457, 459 (1981) (per curiam); see
Kolder et al., supra note 9, at 1194.
65. Stewart, slip op. at 4.
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drinking alcohol, 66 being injured in an automobile accident while driving
negligently67 or under the influence of alcohol, 68 taking prescription
drugs,69 and taking illegal drugs.70
Indeed, absent the protection of strict scrutiny, there is no logical
stopping point to the kinds of personal decisions by women that could be
second guessed by zealous prosecutors, estranged husbands and former
lovers, or judges scrutinizing an isolated decision with the benefit of
hindsight. A legal framework that does not require strict scrutiny of ad-
versarial policies could create a separate legal regime in which, with the
most minimal of justifications, women-but not men-could be deprived
of the right to make countless important judgments critical to personal
autonomy. The burdens placed on women who choose to become preg-
nant, or simply to remain fertile, could be sufficiently onerous to pressure
some to avoid or even terminate otherwise wanted pregnancies. Women
might also be pushed into submitting to unwanted sterilizations, as has
resulted from policies of private employers that exclude fertile women
from certain jobs involving exposure to substances that pose risks to fetal
development. 71
Thus, any governmental action that follows the adversarial model
by placing special restrictions on women based solely on their role in
childbearing must be strictly scrutinized, even though the Constitution
does not protect as fundamental the right to engage in many activities
potentially affected. For example, the government certainly can impose
criminal sanctions to prevent the use of cocaine. The fact that a woman
is pregnant does not immunize her from prosecution under a criminal
law of general application. Yet when the government prosecutes a wo-
man for a crime not applicable to male users or imposes harsher penalties
solely because the woman was pregnant when she used cocaine, the level
of constitutional protection and judicial scrutiny increases because the
66. Levendosky, Turning Women, supra note 3, at AS; Levendosky, Using the Law, supra
note 3, at A8.
67. Stallman v. Youngquist, 152 Ill. App. 3d 683, 692, 504 N.E.2d 921, 925 (1987), rev'd,
125 Ill. 2d 267, 531 N.E.2d 355 (1988).
68. Loth, supra note 1, at 25; Daly, supra note 1, at A4.
69. Grodin v. Grodin, 102 Mich. App. 396, 401, 301 N.W.2d 869, 871 (1980) (tetracy-
cline); In re J. Jeffrey, No. 99851 (Mich. Ct. App. Apr. 9, 1987), summarized in LEGAL
DOCKET, supra note 2, at 140 (valium).
70. See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 578 So. 2d 419 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991), appeal docketed
No. 77831 (Fla. Sup. Ct. March 6, 1992); Commonwealth v. Pellegrini, No. 87970, slip op. at 1
(Mass. Super. Ct. Oct. 15, 1990); People v. Bremer, No. 90-32227-FH, slip op. at 1 (Mich. Cir.
Ct. Jan. 31, 1991).
71. See, e.g., UAW v. Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct. 1196, 1199-2000 (1991) (plaintiffs
included woman who had been sterilized in order to retain her job).
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woman's pregnant status is an essential element of the charge. Similarly,
although the Constitution does not guarantee a fundamental right to
drive fifty-five miles per hour, and pregnancy does not create such a fun-
damental right, a law that required only pregnant women to drive forty-
five miles per hour where others could drive fifty-five would be constitu-
tionally suspect. It is the woman's pregnancy-or her ability to become
pregnant-that is the impetus for governmental action under the adver-
sarial model, whether it be a court-ordered medical procedure or a crimi-
nal prosecution for delivering drugs to a "minor" through the umbilical
cord or for "prenatal child abuse." And it is this imposition of addi-
tional, special burdens aimed specifically at the procreative aspect of wo-
men's behavior that is deeply threatening to women's liberty and
therefore deserving of strict scrutiny.
B. The Application of Strict Scrutiny to Adversarial Policies
As is true for any governmental interference with a fundamental in-
dividual right, a legislature, court, or other governmental actor may
place special restrictions and additional penalties on women's actions as
they relate to childbearing only if it can justify the constitutional in-
fringement under the strict scrutiny standard of judicial review.72 The
United States Supreme Court has repeatedly ruled that this standard re-
quires the government to show that the challenged action is both "neces-
sary to serve a compelling state interest" and "narrowly drawn to achieve
that end."'73
Although the Court has never articulated precise guidelines as to
what these requirements entail-for example, how exactly an interest
qualifies as "compelling"-it has provided some guidance. A court may
not simply accept the government's assertion that the interest it is pursu-
ing is "compelling." 74 Rather, the court must carefully scrutinize even
interests that appear compelling in the abstract to ensure that they justify
the specific deprivation of the right at issue and are compelling in the
72. For another discussion of the strict scrutiny standard as it applies to certain special
restrictions on women's behavior that follow the adversarial model, see Dawn Johnsen, From
Driving to Drugs: Governmental Regulation of Pregnant Women's Lives After Webster, 138 U.
PA. L. REV. 179, 204-15 (1989).
73. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321-22 (1988) (quoting Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local
Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983) (citing cases).
74. For a comprehensive, thoughtful discussion of the compelling interest requirement as
applied in the context of abortion restrictions, see Walter Dellinger & Gene B. Sperling, Abor-
tion and the Supreme Court: The Retreat From Roe v. Wade, 138 U. PA. L. RaV. 83 (1989);
see also Brief of Seventy-Seven Organizations Committed to Women's Equality as Amici Cu-
riae in Support of Appellees at 17-30, Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490
(1989).
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particular context and manner in which they are being asserted.75 For a
restriction to be considered "narrowly drawn" to achieve the compelling
interest, it must be the least "restrictive alternative"-that is, the means
of achieving the governmental goal that is least intrusive on the funda-
mental right at stake.76
Critical to the strict scrutiny standard, the restriction sought by the
government must actually serve or promote the compelling interest. An
adversarial policy that is harmful to the governmental interest being pur-
sued obviously cannot be said to serve that interest. Thus, such a policy
will not survive strict scrutiny.
Because significant use of the adversarial model has emerged only in
the last decade, no federal court and only a few state courts have consid-
ered the application of strict scrutiny to an adversarial policy. When
confronted with a legal challenge, the government is likely to assert that
the restriction on women's liberty is necessary to serve its interest in pro-
moting healthy births. This interest is undoubtedly an important one for
the government to pursue, and, as discussed above,77 most means of
achieving this goal actually further women's interests and raise no consti-
tutional problems. But in those instances in which the government
chooses a response that infringes upon women's fundamental liberty, the
role of the courts is to strictly scrutinize that action and determine
whether it is justified.
Although the precise analysis varies depending on the context, gov-
ernmental actions that follow the adversarial model are likely to fail
strict scrutiny for three general reasons. First, in order to justify overrid-
ing a woman's decision, the government must demonstrate that it is bet-
ter able than the woman to make the "right" decision. Yet, in the
contexts in which the government has sought to dictate women's behav-
75. Boos, 485 U.S. at 323, 324 (though "[a]s a general proposition" the government "has
a vital national interest" in protecting foreign diplomats in accordance with international law,
that interest is not "automatically render[ed] . . . 'compelling"' when its assertion infringes
upon First Amendment rights); see also City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,
497-98 (1989) (governmental interest in redressing generalized societal discrimination deemed
to be not sufficiently compelling to justify race conscious remedies); Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S.
1012, 1020 (1988) (criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment rights "outweighed" state's interest
in "protecting victims of sexual abuse"); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 244 (1944)
(Jackson, J., dissenting) (arguing that courts may not "distort" the Constitution in order to
approve all that the state may deem to be expedient and in the national interest when funda-
mental rights are at stake).
76. Boos, 485 U.S. at 329; Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971) (governmental
interest in preserving public order not sufficiently weighty to justify restrictions on free expres-
sion because it is "inherently boundless").
77. See supra section II.A.
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 43
SHARED INTERESTS
ior through adversarial policies, there rarely has existed a clear "right"
decision; rather, they have involved inherently complex judgments bal-
ancing competing interests and have been fraught with uncertainty as to
the likely effects on fetal development. A court or legislature is unlikely
to be able to make the requisite showing that it is better situated than the
woman whose life and liberty are at issue to make the complicated judg-
ments-where to work, when to take medication necessary for her own
health, whether to spend limited resources on prenatal care or food for
her children-that necessarily vary from case to case according to each
woman's circumstances.
Second, adversarial policies typically will fail that aspect of the strict
scrutiny standard that requires the challenged action to be effective in
furthering the asserted compelling interest. Their overall effect typically
is not to advance the government's asserted interest in promoting healthy
births, but to encourage behavior by women that is counter to that goal.
In determining whether an adversarial policy actually serves the govern-
mental interest, the court must examine not only the case at hand, but
also the more general effects of the policy at issue. If a governmental
action may improve the chances of a healthy birth in one particular case,
but only at the cost of causing many other less healthy births, then the
action cannot be said to further the asserted governmental interest. The
overwhelming consensus within the medical and public health commu-
nity is that taking an adversarial approach is ineffective and even
counterproductive. 78 Adversarial policies fail to address and often exac-
erbate the root causes of poor birth outcomes, because the government's
threat of interference and punishment frightens away the women most in
need of health care.
Finally, even if they could be shown to further the government's
asserted goal, adversarial policies do not satisfy the requirement that they
be "narrowly drawn" to achieve that goal, because effective "less restric-
tive alternatives" typically exist. The government can better pursue its
goals through actions that follow the facilitative model of improving ma-
ternal and infant health by helping rather than punishing women. Be-
cause facilitative approaches both are more effective and do not interfere
with women's fundamental rights, the government may not constitution-
ally pursue adversarial policies.
The remainder of this section will consider the application of the
strict scrutiny standard to each of the four principal ways in which the
adversarial model has thus far been used: (1) employment policies ex-
78. See sources cited supra note 12 and infra notes 138-144.
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cluding women from certain jobs in the name of "fetal protection";
(2) the creation of special, broadly defined, government imposed stan-
dards of behavior for women, such as a crime of "prenatal abuse" or civil
liability for failing to act as a "reasonable" pregnant woman; (3) court
orders compelling women to undergo cesarean sections against their will;
and (4) the imposition of special penalties on women for the use of illegal
drugs based solely on the fact that the women were pregnant at the time
of use. Applying the requirements of strict scrutiny as outlined by the
Supreme Court reveals that each of these types of adversarial actions
would likely fail strict scrutiny.
(1) Exclusionary Employment Policies
Although no federal court has considered the constitutional limita-
tions on the adversarial model, the United States Supreme Court held in
March 1991 that an employer's implementation of an adversarial policy
violated Title VII, the federal statute prohibiting sex discrimination in
employment. 79 In UAW v. Johnson Controls, s0 the Supreme Court struck
down Johnson Controls' policy excluding all women who had not proven
that they were infertile from working in positions where they would be
exposed to lead-positions that were among the highest paid at the com-
pany. The Court ruled that by enacting the Pregnancy Discrimination
Act to amend Title VII, Congress prohibited employers from adopting
policies excluding fertile women from jobs based on potential harm to
fetuses.8 1
The most complete judicial description to date of the dangers posed
by using women's role in childbearing as the justification for special re-
strictions on their behavior is that given by Judge Frank Easterbrook of
the Seventh Circuit in a dissent that reached the same conclusion ulti-
mately adopted by the Supreme Court. Judge Easterbrook explained
that to uphold the company's policy would be to set a sweeping prece-
dent that could not easily be confined, and noted that twenty million jobs
could ultimately be closed to women under the proffered rationale.
82
Judge Easterbrook observed:
The hazards created by occupational chemicals span many orders of
magnitude: some are safer than the sweeteners we wolf down, some
are dangerous indeed. Where does lead fit on that spectrum? I cannot
believe that Johnson would be entitled to fire female employees who
79. UAW v. Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct. 1196, 1203 (1991).
80. Id.
81. Id. at 1204.
82. UAW v. Johnson Controls, 886 F.2d 871, 920 (7th Cir. 1989) (en banc) (Easterbrook,
J., dissenting), rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 1196 (1991).
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smoke or drink during pregnancy-let alone fire all female employees
because some might smoke or drink-which makes it hard to exclude
women to curtail risk from other substances.
How does the risk attributable to lead compare, say, to the risk to
the next generation created by driving a taxi? A female bus or taxi
driver is exposed to noxious fumes and the risk of accidents, all haz-
ardous to a child she carries. Would it follow that taxi and bus compa-
nies can decline to hire women? That an employer could forbid
pregnant employees to drive cars, because of the risk accidents pose to
fetuses?8 3
In addition to setting a dangerous precedent, an exclusionary policy
such as Johnson Controls' requires that even women who are not sexu-
ally active or who do not plan to bear children subordinate all other pur-
suits to the elimination of risks to a potential future fetus they have no
intention of conceiving. A forty year-old divorced woman struggling to
raise three children on her own is denied the job along with a woman
who is pregnant or attempting to conceive. Indeed, the plaintiffs in John-
son Controls included a fifty year-old divorced woman who had been
transferred to a lower paying job and a woman who had been sterilized in
order to keep her job.84 In another dissent from the Seventh Circuit's
Johnson Controls decision, Judge Cudahy recognized it is far from clear
that denying the job to even a pregnant woman is in the best interests of
her future child:
What is the situation of the pregnant woman, unemployed or working
for the minimum wage and unprotected by health insurance, in rela-
tion to her pregnant sister, exposed to an indeterminate lead risk but
well fed, housed and doctored? Whose fetus is at greater risk? Whose
decision is this to make?8 5
The Supreme Court agreed with Judge Cudahy that in enacting Ti-
tle VII Congress had determined that it is the woman's decision to make:
"Employment late in pregnancy often imposes risks on the unborn child,
... but Congress made clear that the decision to become pregnant or to
work while being either pregnant or capable of becoming pregnant was
reserved for each individual woman to make for herself."' 86 Although the
ruling rested on an interpretation of the federal statute, the Court im-
plied that it made sense for Congress to leave such decisions to the wo-
man because she was most directly affected and it would be inappropriate
for a court or employer to override her judgment about how to balance
competing factors in her life:
83. Id. at 916-17.
84. Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct. at 1200.
85. Johnson Controls, 886 F.2d at 902 (Cudahy, J., dissenting).
86. Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct. at 1207.
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Decisions about the welfare of future children must be left to the
parents who conceive, bear, support, and raise them rather than to the
employers who hire those parents.
It is no more appropriate for the courts than it is for individual
employers to decide whether a woman's reproductive role is more im-
portant to herself and her family than her economic role. Congress
has left this choice to the woman as hers to make. 87
The Supreme Court also noted that the justification offered for the exclu-
sionary policy echoed the rationale used less than a century ago to re-
strict women's participation in paid employment and political and civic
affairs: 88 "Concern for a woman's existing or potential offspring histori-
cally has been the excuse for denying women equal employment
opportunities. '8 9
(2) Broadly Defined Required Standards of Behavior
The adversarial policies that most clearly cannot survive strict judi-
cial scrutiny are those that require women to comply with broadly de-
fined standards of behavior during and even prior to pregnancy. For
example, in recent years, women have been criminally prosecuted for be-
havior during pregnancy under child abuse and neglect statutes, and in
one case under a statute requiring a parent "to furnish necessary cloth-
ing, food, shelter or medical attendance, or other remedial care for his or
her child." 90 In the civil context, a Michigan court ruled in 1980 that a
boy could sue his mother for injuries caused by her actions during preg-
nancy that did not meet the "reasonable" pregnant woman standard.91
Some legal commentators have advocated creating a "duty to bring the
child into the world as healthy as is reasonably possible," 92 "a fetal right
to begin life with a sound body and mind,"'93 or a crime of "fetal
abuse." 94
87. Id. at 1207-10.
88. See infra section V.A.
89. Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct. at 1210.
90. CAL. PENAL CODE § 270 (West 1988); People v. Stewart, No. M508197 (Cal. Mun.
Ct. Feb. 26, 1987); see also Reyes v. Superior Court, 75 Cal. App. 3d 214, 141 Cal. Rptr. 912
(1977) (reversing a conviction of a woman for child endangerment for heroin use during her
last two months of pregnancy); People v. Hardy, No. 128458 (Mich. Ct. App. Apr. 1, 1991)
(reversing denial of motion to quash charge of delivery of cocaine through umbilical cord).
91. Grodin v. Grodin, 102 Mich. App. 396, 401, 301 N.W.2d 869, 871 (1980).
92. John A. Robertson, Procreative Liberty and the Control of Conception, Pregnancy,
and Childbirth, 69 VA. L. REV. 405, 438 (1983).
93. Charles J. Dougherty, The Right to Begin Life with Sound Body and Mind: Fetal
Patients and Conflicts with Their Mothers, 63 U. DET. L. REv. 89, 89 (1985).
94. Margery W. Shaw, Conditional Prospective Rights of the Fetus, 5 J. LEGAL MED. 63,
98-100 (1984). One advocate of policies that follow the adversarial model, Dr. Margery Shaw,
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The legal imposition of such required standards of behavior would
allow the government broad discretion to intrude upon countless aspects
of women's lives. As the Supreme Court of Illinois noted in holding that
a girl could not sue her mother for allegedly causing her to suffer prena-
tal injuries, if women could be sued by their children for their actions
during pregnancy "[mI]other and child would be legal adversaries from
the moment of conception until birth."95 The government cannot justify
such sweeping, vaguely defined standards of mandatory behavior as
"necessary to serve a compelling state interest."' 96 Moreover, subjecting
women to a standard of legally required behavior that targets not only
undesirable activities but also constitutionally protected behavior which
is socially and personally desirable cannot be said to be "narrowly tai-
lored." 97 By fully implementing facilitative policies, the government
could more effectively advance its interest in promoting desirable behav-
ior without unnecessarily restricting women's fundamental rights.
The criminal prosecution in 1985 of a California woman named
Pamela Rae Stewart-one of the first premised on the adversarial
model-helps illustrate the government's lack of justification for taking
away a woman's right to make these judgments.98 Ms. Stewart was pros-
describes a woman's "prenatal duties" necessary to avoid legal liability as including "regular
prenatal checkups, a balanced diet with vitamin, iron, and calcium supplementation, weight
control, and judicious use of medications, tobacco, and caffeine." Id. at 83. Women's behav-
ior prior to pregnancy that creates risks to future children could also be grounds for liability.
Dr. Shaw writes:
[P]arents may be found to have a duty to receive genetic counseling and carrier test-
ing, to use contraceptives, to be sterilized, to reveal a genetic risk to a spouse or
relative, to protect their gonads against adverse effects, and to consider whether they
have a "right" to knowingly pass on deleterious genes.
Id. at 93. In support of creating a "duty not to conceive," she writes that parents "should be
held accountable to their offspring for causing misery, pain, suffering, and death if it could
have been avoided." Id.
95. Stallman v. Youngquist, 125 Ill. 2d 267, 276, 531 N.E.2d 355, 359 (1988).
96. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321-22 (1988).
97. The Supreme Court has rejected the assertion of interests that might otherwise be
considered compelling where, as here, the resulting constitutional deprivations would be "in-
herently boundless," Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971), and "essentially limitless in
scope and duration," City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 498 (1989).
98. Information about People v. Stewart is taken from the following sources: People v.
Stewart, No. M508197 (Cal. Mun. Ct. Feb. 26, 1987); Defendant's Memorandum of Points
and Authorities in Support of Motion to Dismiss, People v. Stewart; Memorandum of Points
and Authorities in Support of Demurrer to Complaint Without Leave to Amend, People v.
Stewart; Angela Bonavoglia, The Ordeal of Pamela Rae Stewart, Ms., July/Aug. 1987, at 92;
Drop the Charge Against Stewart, SAN DIEGO TRIB., Nov. 11, 1986, at B6; Neighbors Cite
Mother's Troubled Past, DAILY CALIFORNIAN, at IA; Woman Charged in Fetal Neglect Did
Not Abuse Drugs, Husband Says, SAN DIEGO UNION, Sept. 30, 1986, at BI. For further dis-
cussion of the Stewart case, see Dawn Johnsen, A New Threat to Pregnant Women's Autonomy,
HASTINGS CENTER REP. at 33 (Aug. 1987).
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ecuted for allegedly causing the death of her son through her actions
while pregnant, under a statute that requires a parent "to furnish neces-
sary clothing, food, shelter or medical attendance, or other remedial care
for his or her child." 99 Although the court ultimately ruled that the stat-
ute did not apply to the conduct at issue, the circumstances of Ms. Stew-
art's life and pregnancy reveal the types of complex judgments women
must make that could become the basis for criminal or civil liability
under broad standards of governmentally mandated behavior.
Ms. Stewart gave birth in 1985 to her third child. Tragically, her
son was born with severe brain damage and died six weeks later. Ms.
Stewart was arrested-and jailed for six days before she could make
bail-for allegedly causing his death through her failure to follow her
doctor's advice and obtain prompt medical care while pregnant, which
the prosecutor claimed constituted failure to provide the "medical at-
tendance" to her fetus required by the statute. Ms. Stewart had a diffi-
cult pregnancy and suffered from a dangerous condition known as
placenta previa. This ultimately caused her to experience substantial
blood loss as the result of vaginal hemorrhaging-threatening to her own
life-that the prosecution claimed led to her son being born brain dam-
aged. The prosecutor argued that Ms. Stewart should be held criminally
liable because she might have delivered a healthy baby if she had sought
medical care as soon as she began bleeding vaginally, rather than alleg-
edly waiting a number of hours.I°°
Ms. Stewart, like all women, made decisions about health care
against the backdrop of her resources and competing responsibilities.
Like many women, she faced significant obstacles to obtaining adequate
medical care. She was very poor and had two small daughters to care
for; while she was pregnant, the entire family lived first in a single hotel
room and then in a mobile home they shared with her mother-in-law.
Ms. Stewart apparently was also the victim of physical abuse by her hus-
band. The police were called between ten and fifteen times over the
course of a year to intervene when Mr. Stewart was abusive. Despite
these difficult circumstances, Ms. Stewart did obtain some prenatal care.
Although the prosecutor had her imprisoned for allegedly waiting a
number of hours after she began bleeding before seeking medical assist-
99. CAL. PENAL CODE § 270 (West 1988).
100. The prosecutor also cited other activities in which Ms. Stewart allegedly engaged
against her doctor's advice, including having sexual intercourse with her husband and taking
marijuana and amphetamines, but it was her loss of blood that the prosecutor alleged caused
the injury.
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ance, Ms. Stewart had gone to the hospital on two prior occasions specifi-
cally because she was experiencing vaginal bleeding. 101
Even if the loss of Ms. Stewart's son could have been avoided by her
obtaining better medical care, the government does not have a compel-
ling interest that justifies prosecuting her for the judgment she made
about when to call her doctor. If this type of prosecution were constitu-
tionally permissible, any woman who gave birth to a less than completely
healthy baby would be vulnerable to criminal investigation, prosecution,
and incarceration. Prosecutions based on this sort of statutory provision
also fail to pass strict scrutiny because the overall effect is counter to the
asserted compelling interest of promoting healthy births. In a case in
which the birth has already occurred, as with Ms. Stewart's prosecution,
there is no possibility of helping the child directly at issue. Only by en-
couraging other women to obtain better medical care could the prosecu-
tion possibly promote future healthy births. Health care providers
overwhelmingly agree, however, that the effect of prosecutions like Ms.
Stewart's is just the opposite.10 2 They deter-not encourage-women
from seeking prenatal care and even proper medical care during the ac-
tual delivery. Women are led to fear subjecting their actions during preg-
nancy to official scrutiny and inviting accusations by prosecutors that
they failed to follow their doctors' advice. The women most likely to fear
prosecution and therefore avoid health care are those most in need of it:
Women at greater risk of having poor birth outcomes due to illness, pov-
erty, or drug or alcohol addiction. As a result of this single failed prose-
cution of Ms. Stewart, health care and drug treatment providers in the
San Diego area reported that women were deterred from seeking care by
fear of arrest and prosecution.10 3 Governmental policies that take a
facilitative approach and provide pregnant women with services such as
prenatal medical care provide an obvious, less intrusive, and more effec-
tive alternative to this adversarial approach.
(3) Court-Ordered Cesarean Sections
The issuance of court orders forcing women to give birth by
cesarean section provides another context in which the government can-
not establish a compelling interest to justify overriding women's deci-
sions. A survey published in the New England Journal of Medicine
reported cases in eleven states in which courts issued orders directing
101. Bonavoglia, supra note 98, at 95.
102. See supra notes 138-153 and accompanying text.
103. Defendant's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion to Dis-
miss, supra note 98, at 21-23.
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women to undergo such surgical procedures against their will.104 The
purported justification for this extraordinary interference with women's
liberty and bodily integrity has been the well being of the fetus.
In 1990, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals sitting en banc
became the first appellate court to consider the full constitutional impli-
cations of forcing a woman to undergo a cesarean section. The court
held in In re A. C. 105 that a lower court's issuance of a court order was
unconstitutional because the government did not possess an interest suffi-
ciently compelling to override the woman's right to make her own judg-
ment. 10 6 The court's opinion, however, was not issued until long after
the cesarean section had been performed. The facts of In re A. C. provide
tragic and compelling evidence that such decisions must be left to the
woman.
Twenty-seven year-old Angela Carder (identified in the opinion by
her initials "A.C.") was twenty-six weeks pregnant and ill with cancer,
which she had successfully battled since age thirteen, when she was or-
dered by a court to give birth by cesarean section. 10 7 The order was
issued at the hospital's request over the unanimous objections of Ms.
Carder, her husband, her parents, and her physicians, and despite evi-
dence that the fetus might not be viable and that the surgery might cause
Ms. Carder's death, given her poor health. A three judge panel of the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals refused to stay the order and the
surgery was performed. 10 8 In fact, the fetus did not survive, and Ms.
Carder died two days after the surgery. The cesarean section was re-
ferred to on her death certificate as a contributing factor.
As is inevitably true in these cases, the court proceedings were held
under tremendous time pressure, with little opportunity for the woman
to present her case. The entire process took only six hours, from the time
the hospital first went to court to the time the surgery was performed.
The judge never spoke to Ms. Carder; the attorney appointed to repre-
sent her had no opportunity to meet with her, review her medical
records, or prepare or call witnesses; and the physician who had the long-
est history of treating her was not notified of the hearing.10 9 A lawyer
was appointed to represent the fetus, and she argued: "I think the poten-
104. Kolder et al., supra note 9, at 1193.
105. 573 A.2d 1235 (D.C. 1990) (en banc).
106. Id. at 1237.
107. Id. at 1238.
108. Id. at 1238-40.
109. Transcript of Proceedings, In re A.C., No. 87-609 (D.C. Super. Ct. June 16, 1987);
Affidavit of Jeffrey A. Moscow, M.D., In re A.C.; Amended Brief on the Merits at 15, In re
A.C
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tiality of this fetus outweighs the imminent death of the patient." 110 In
ordering the surgery, the trial court judge stated: "It's not an easy deci-
sion to make, but given the choices, the Court is of the view the fetus
should be given an opportunity to live." '111
The three judge appellate panel's opinion, 112 issued after Ms.
Carder's death, provides a disturbing example of the dangers of allowing
a court to substitute its own judgment for that of the woman affected. In
explaining the way in which it balanced the interests involved, the court
acknowledged "we well know that we may have shortened A.C.'s life
span,"113 but discounted the value of Ms. Carder's life because she was
likely to die soon in any event: "The Caesarean section would not signifi-
cantly affect A.C.'s condition because she had, at best, two days left of
sedated life; the complications arising from the surgery would not signifi-
cantly alter that prognosis."114 In fact, this finding was disputed in an
affidavit subsequently submitted by Ms. Carder's treating physician who
stated that, had he been notified of the hearing, he would have testified
that the surgery interfered with Ms. Carder's ability to receive potentially
beneficial chemotherapy that could have allowed her to live longer.11 5
Nevertheless, the court found that the value of Ms. Carder's life was out-
weighed by the admittedly "slim" chance that the fetus might survive:
"The court based its decision to deny a stay on the medical judgment
that A.C. would not survive for a significant time after the surgery and
that the fetus had a better, though slim, chance if taken before A.C.'s
imminent death."11 6
The willingness of both the trial court and the three judge panel to
discount the value of Ms. Carder's rights and her very life is chilling.
Such disregard on the part of a tribunal powerfully illustrates why the
government must not be allowed to take from the woman whose body
will be subjected to surgery the ability to balance these competing factors
for herself. Indeed, in this case the only conflict of interests was the con-
flict created by the hospital in seeking the order and the court in issuing
it.
In an opinion issued almost three years after Ms. Carder's death, the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, ruled that "every
110. Transcript at 79, In re A. C
111. Id. at 84.
112. In re A.C., 533 A.2d 611 (D.C. 1987), rev'don reh'g, 573 A.2d 1235 (D.C. 1990) (en
bane).
113. Id. at 613-14.
114. Id. at 617.
115. Affidavit of Jeffrey A. Moscow, M.D., In re A.C
116. In re A.C., 533 A.2d at 613.
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person has the right, under the common law and the Constitution, to
accept or refuse medical treatment" and that directing a woman to sub-
mit to a cesarean section against her will interferes with this fundamental
right.'1 7 In a particularly graphic passage, the court focused on the vio-
lent bodily intrusion necessary to enforce an order against a woman who
refused to comply:
What if A.C. had refused to comply with a court order that she submit
to a caesarean?... Enforcement could be accomplished only through
physical force or its equivalent. A.C. would have to be fastened with
restraints to the operating table, or perhaps involuntarily rendered un-
conscious by forcibly injecting her with an anesthetic, and then sub-
jected to unwanted major surgery. Such actions would surely give one
pause in a civilized society, especially when A.C. had done no
wrong. 118
The court found no governmental interest sufficiently compelling to over-
ride the woman's decision and ruled that her right to choose must be
protected: "[I]n virtually all cases the question of what is to be done is to
be decided by the patient-the pregnant woman--on behalf of herself
and the fetus." 119
The AMA has issued a comprehensive policy statement which con-
cludes, as did the D.C. Court of Appeals, that physicians should not seek
and courts should not issue orders overriding a pregnant woman's deci-
sion whether to have a cesarean section. Noting that "[p]erforming med-
ical procedures against the pregnant woman's will violates her right to
informed consent and her constitutional right to bodily integrity,"120 the
AMA statement stresses the inappropriateness of any party other than
the woman herself performing the necessary balancing of interests:
[D]ecisions that would result in health risks are properly made only by
the individual who must bear the risk. Considerable uncertainty can
surround medical evaluations of the risks and benefits of obstetrical
interventions. Through a court-ordered intervention, a physician de-
prives a pregnant woman of her right to reject personal risk and re-
places it with the physician's evaluation of the amount of risk that is
properly acceptable. This undermines the very concept of informed
consent. 121
117. In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1247 (D.C. 1990) (en banc).
118. Id. at 1244 n.8.
119. Idl at 1237.
120. AMA, Legal Interventions During Pregnancy, supra note 12, at 2663.
121. Id. at 2665. Although the AMA declined to adopt an absolute rule that no situation
exists in which a physician should seek judicial intervention, it noted:
[A] woman conceivably could refuse oral administration of a drug that would cause
no ill effects in her own body but would almost certainly prevent a substantial and
irreversible injury to her fetus. Given the current state of medical technology, it is
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Even the medical judgment about the risk to the fetus is fraught
with uncertainties that weaken the government's asserted interest in
overriding a woman's decision. Not only was the court wrong about the
viability of the fetus in In re A. C., the New England Journal of Medicine
survey found anecdotal evidence of six cases in which the prediction of
fetal harm proved to be inaccurate.1 22 In one of these cases, a Georgia
court based its decision on medical testimony that without the cesarean
section, there was a "99 percent certainty" that the fetus would not sur-
vive, as well as at least a "50 percent chance" that the woman herself
would die.123 In fact, the cesarean section was never performed and the
woman had a safe vaginal delivery, without any harm to her or the
baby. 124
Allowing court-ordered cesarean sections not only fails to serve, but
is harmful to, the government's asserted interest in promoting healthy
births. The AMA report discusses the adverse consequences of the prac-
tice, which include engendering distrust of physicians by pregnant wo-
men: "[W]omen may withhold information from the physician that they
feel might lead the physician to seek judicial intervention. Or they may
reject medical or prenatal care altogether, seriously impairing a physi-
cian's ability to treat both the pregnant woman and her fetus."' 25
The AMA concludes that "while the health of a few infants may be
preserved by overriding a pregnant woman's decision,"' 26 the overall ef-
fect-which is the relevant issue for constitutional analysis-is that "the
health of a great many more may be sacrificed."'' 27 Thus, the govern-
ment's objective is not served. In fact, the issuance of the order may
directly endanger the health of the future child directly involved. In at
least one case, the woman against whom such an order was directed left
the hospital to avoid the procedure. 128 In the case of Angela Carder,
neither she nor her child survived.
unlikely that such a situation would occur. In addition, as a practical matter, it is
unlikely that a woman would refuse treatment in that situation.
Id. at 2666; see also ACOG Committee Opinion, supra note 12, at 1 (noting "limitations and
fallibility" of obstetricians' assessments of medical risks and that a pregnant woman "evaluates
the risks and benefits presented to her from her own sense of values").
122. Kolder et al., supra note 9, at 1195.
123. Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hosp. Auth., 247 Ga. 86, 86, 274 S.E.2d 457,
459 (1981) (per curiam).
124. AMA, Legal Interventions During Pregnancy, supra note 12, at 2664.
125. Id. at 2666.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 2665; see also Gallagher, supra note 10, at 47.
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(4) Special Penalties for Drug Use During Pregnancy
Courts, legislatures, and other governmental actors have most often
taken an adversarial approach when addressing the use by pregnant wo-
men of harmful substances, such as cocaine and heroin, that already have
been criminalized for the general public. Dozens of women have been
criminally prosecuted, incarcerated, and deprived of custody of their
children because they were pregnant when they used drugs. 129 Few
courts have considered the constitutionality of such special prosecutions
because in most cases charges ultimately have been dismissed on the
ground that the statute under which charges were brought was being
misused. 130 For example, women have been prosecuted for prenatal
child abuse and distribution of cocaine to a minor,1 31 offenses much more
serious than possession, because they were pregnant at the time of use.
Courts in at least two states, Michigan and Massachusetts, have
ruled not only that the statutes were inapplicable, but also that the prose-
cutions interfered with women's fundamental liberties and failed strict
scrutiny.132 In the Massachusetts case, Commonwealth v. Pellegrini, 
133
the court described the level of governmental intrusion into a woman's
life entailed by such a prosecution: "In order to prosecute Ms. Pellegrini,
the commonwealth must intrude into her most private areas, her inner
body."'134 It also noted that "the level of state intervention and control
over a woman's body required by the prosecution" would set a dangerous
precedent for numerous other pregnancy related restrictions on wo-
men.' 35 To date, the only appellate court to uphold a criminal prosecu-
129. See sources cited supra notes 4, 7. For thoughtful discussions of this general issue, see
Molly McNulty, Pregnancy Police: The Health, Policy and Legal Implications of Punishing
Pregnant Women for Harm to Their Fetuses, 16 N.Y.U. REv. L. & SOCIAL CHANGE 277
(1987-88); Kary L. Moss, Substance Abuse During Pregnancy, 13 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 278
(1990); Note, Maternal Rights and Fetal Wrongs: The Case Against the Criminalization of
"Fetal Abuse," 101 HARV. L. REv. 995 (1988).
130. See, e.g., People v. Stewart, No. M508197 (Cal. Mun. Ct. Feb. 26, 1987); People v.
Hardy, No. 128458 (Mich. Ct. App. Apr. 1, 1991).
13 1. Prosecutors have argued that the definition of "minor" under the statute was satisfied
because cocaine may have been passed from the woman's body to her child's body after birth
in the seconds before the umbilical cord was cut.
132. Commonwealth v. Pellegrini, No. 87970, slip op. at 9 (Mass. Super. Ct. Oct. 15,
1990); People v. Bremer, No. 90-32227-FH, slip op. at 15 (Mich. Cir. Ct. Jan. 31, 1991).
133. No. 87970 (Mass. Super. Ct. Oct. 15, 1990).
134. Id. at 6.
135. Id. at 9. A New York court described the dangerous potential for sweeping intru-
sions on women's liberty, ruling that a woman's fundamental right to privacy would be vio-
lated by finding her guilty of child neglect based solely on her use of drugs while pregnant and
without considering her potential fitness as a parent:
To carry the . . . argument to its logical extension, the State would be able to
supercede [sic] a mother's custody right to her child if she smoked cigarettes during
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tion of this type did so with only a cursory discussion of the
constitutional issues. 136 The conviction currently is being appealed to
the Florida Supreme Court.
Women who use illegal drugs during pregnancy obviously can be
prosecuted under laws of general application. As with any adversarial
policy, the factor that triggers the need for strict judicial scrutiny is the
imposition of special restrictions (such as increased criminal penalties or
charges) only on pregnant women engaging in the forbidden activity.
The government may not single out women who are pregnant for harsher
treatment unless the additional restriction is necessary and narrowly tai-
lored to further a compelling interest.
It is in the context of drug use by pregnant women that the use of
the adversarial model initially may seem to be the most justified and
likely to survive strict scrutiny. The government clearly has a strong
interest in reducing pregnant women's use of illegal drugs and other po-
tentially harmful substances such as alcohol. The risks posed to fetal
development by a woman's use of substances such as cocaine have been
widely publicized.137 What is at issue, however, is not the legitimacy of
the governmental interest, but whether the means chosen to effectuate
that interest are appropriate and constitutionally permissible.
Evidence and opinion are overwhelming that penalties directed only
at women who use illegal drugs during pregnancy are counterproductive
to the government's objective of promoting healthy births and therefore
do not serve a compelling state interest. Recognizing their adverse con-
sequences, a wide variety of professional and public interest organiza-
tions concerned with infant and maternal health have vigorously opposed
governmental responses that take an adversarial approach. Among the
organizations taking a stance against special penalties directed at drug
her pregnancy, or ate junk food, or did too much physical labor or did not exercise
enough. The list of potential intrusions is long and constitute entirely unacceptable
violations of the bodily integrity of women.
In re Fletcher, No. N-3968/88, slip op. at 6 (N.Y. Fan. Ct., Oct. 7, 1988). The court noted
that "[b]y becoming pregnant, women do not waive the constitutional protection afforded to
other citizens." Id.
136. See Johnson v. State, 578 So. 2d 419 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991), appeal docketed, No.
77831 (Fla. Sup. Ct. March 6, 1992).
137. Recent articles have suggested that initial reports of the adverse effects to fetal devel-
opment of illegal maternal drug use may have been exaggerated and premature. See Linda C.
Mayes et al., The Problem of Prenatal Cocaine Exposure: A Rush to Judgment, 267 JAMA 406
(1992); Kathy Fackelman, The Crack-Baby Myth, WASH. CITY PAPER, Dec. 13, 1991, at 25;
Ellen Goodman, Beyond the "Crack Baby" Horror Lies the Pain of Troubled Kids, MIAMI
HERALD, Jan. 16, 1992, at 23A.
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use by pregnant women are: the American Academy of Pediatrics,138 the
American Medical Association, I39 the American Public Health Associa-
tion, 14° the American Society on Addiction Medicine,141 the March of
Dimes,142 the National Association of Public Child Welfare Administra-
tors, 143 and the Southern Regional Project on Infant Mortality (an initia-
tive of the Southern Governors' Association and the Southern Legislative
Conference). 144 The reason most commonly cited for opposition by these
organizations is that adversarial policies deter women who use drugs
from seeking drug treatment and prenatal care by causing them to fear
consequent arrest and prosecution for a crime such as prenatal child
abuse or distribution to a minor. Both the Massachusetts and Michigan
courts cited this deterrent effect in ruling that these types of prosecution
fail strict scrutiny. 45
138. "The public must be assured of nonpunitive access to comprehensive care which will
meet the needs of the substance abusing pregnant woman and her infant." AMERICAN ACAD-
EMY OF PEDIATRICS, POLICY STATEMENT, DRUG EXPOSED INFANTS 10. "The AAP is con-
cerned that such involuntary measures may discourage mothers and their infants from
receiving the very medical care and social support systems that are crucial to their treatment."
Id
139. AMA, Legal Interventions During Pregnancy, supra note 12, at 2670 ("Criminal sanc-
tions or civil liability for harmful behavior by the pregnant woman toward her fetus are inap-
propriate."); AMA, Treatment Versus Criminalization, supra note 12. ("[T]herefore be it...
resolved that the AMA oppose legislation which criminalizes maternal drug addiction.").
140. The American Public Health Association "recommends that no punitive measures be
taken against pregnant women who are users of illicit drugs when no other illegal acts, includ-
ing drug related offenses, have been committed." American Public Health Ass'n, Policy State-
ments, 81 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 253, 253 (1991) (Policy Statement 9020: Illicit Drug Use by
Pregnant Women).
141. "State and local governments should avoid any measures defining alcohol or other
drug use during pregnancy as 'prenatal child abuse,' and should avoid prosecution, jail, or
other punitive measures as a substitute for providing effective health services for these wo-
men." ASAM Policy Statement on Chemically Dependent Women and Pregnancy, (Am. Soc'y
on Addiction Medicine, Washington, D.C.), ASAM NEws, Sept.-Oct. 1989, at 6.
142. "Punitive approaches to drug addiction may be harmful to pregnant women because
they interfere with access to appropriate health care. Fear of punishment may cause women
most in need of prenatal services to avoid health care professionals." MARCH OF DIMES,
STATEMENT ON MATERNAL DRUG ABUSE 1.
143. "Laws, regulations, or policies that respond to addiction in a primarily punitive na-
ture, requiring human service workers and physicians to function as law enforcement agents
are inappropriate." Nat'l Ass'n of Pub. Child Welfare Adm'rs, supra note 12, at 3.
144. "[S]tates should adopt, as preferred methods, prevention, intervention, and treatment
alternatives rather than punitive actions to ameliorate the problems related to perinatal expo-
sure to drugs and alcohol." Southern Legislative Summit on Healthy Infants and Families:
Policy Statement, SOUTHERN REGIONAL PROJECT ON INFANT MORTALITY (Southern Gover-
nors' Association Southern Legislative Conference, Washington, D.C.) Oct. 4-7, 1990 at 8
[hereinafter Southern Legislative Summit].
145. Commonwealth v. Pellegrini, No.87970, slip op. at 9 (Mass. Super. Ct. Oct. 15,
1990).
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A 1990 report by the United States General Accounting Office
(GAO), which included the results of a survey of health care providers
and others, also described fear of prosecution and loss of custody of their
children as a "barrier to treatment ' 146 for pregnant women dependent on
drugs:
Drug treatment and prenatal care providers told us that the increasing
fear of incarceration and losing children to foster care is discouraging
pregnant women from seeking care. Women are reluctant to seek
treatment if there is a possibility of punishment. They also fear that if
their children are placed in foster care, they will never get the children
back. 147
The report noted as particularly troubling that criminal sanctions
would deter women from seeking not only drug treatment, but also pre-
natal care-care that could "help prevent or at least ameliorate many of
the problems and costs associated with the births of drug-exposed in-
fants."148 When prenatal care is provided, "the chances of an unhealthy
infant are greatly reduced."' 49 In addition to avoiding drug treatment
and prenatal care, women were also found to be giving birth at home,
without medical care, because they feared detection.150
The AMA expressed similar concerns about special prosecutions for
drug use during pregnancy, and noted in particular that even if the
health of a few children would be promoted, the overall effect would be
to sacrifice the well being of many more children:
Pregnant women will be likely to avoid seeking prenatal or other medi-
cal care for fear that their physicians' knowledge of substance abuse or
other potentially harmful behavior could result in a jail sentence rather
than proper medical treatment. This fear is not unfounded .... [T]he
number of women who are convicted and incarcerated for potentially
harmful behavior is likely to be relatively small in comparison with the
number of women who would be prompted to avoid medical care alto-
gether. As a result, the potential well being of many infants may be
sacrificed in order to preserve the health of a few.1 5 1
Adversarial policies may also cause women who do seek prenatal
care to withhold from their doctors and other health care providers in-
146. UNITED STATES GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DRUG-EXPOSED INFANTS: A GENER-
ATION AT RISK 9 (1990).
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 9-10.
150. Id.
151. AMA, Legal Interventions During Pregnancy, supra note 12, at 2667; see also Am.
Soc'y on Addiction Medicine, supra note 141, at 6 ("Criminal prosecution of chemically de-
pendent women will have the overall result of deterring such women from seeking both prena-
tal care and chemical dependency treatment, thereby increasing, rather than preventing, harm
to children and to society as a whole.").
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formation concerning their use of drugs and other potentially harmful
substances such as alcohol-information that is critical to obtaining ap-
propriate care. Particularly counterproductive in this respect are statutes
that require a health care provider to report a patient suspected of using
illegal drugs or other potentially harmful substances during pregnancy to
state authorities. 152 Forcing doctors to betray their patients' confidences
drives a wedge between pregnant women and their doctors and deters
those women who most need health care from obtaining it.153
In addition to discouraging pregnant women from seeking vital
health care, adversarial approaches to the use of illegal drugs during
pregnancy fail to promote healthy births for at least five other reasons.
First, incarcerating women while they are pregnant is often detrimental
to fetal development because of the unhealthy conditions that exist in
prisons. 154 Second, imposing additional penalties for already illegal ac-
tivity is unlikely to be effective, because any deterrent effect of criminal-
ization on the activity should already exist. Third, imposing harsh
criminal penalties on pregnant women may pressure some women to
have unwanted abortions. 155 Fourth, as the Pellegrini court observed,
such prosecutions might well have a harmful effect on women's attitudes
152. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.5561-.5562 (West Supp. 1992).
153. Several medical organizations not only oppose the creation of special crimes directed
at drug use during pregnancy, but also specifically oppose requiring doctors to report pregnant
patients they suspect of using drugs or alcohol. For example, the AMA has adopted a resolu-
tion stating that it opposes "legislation which criminalizes maternal drug addiction or requires
physicians to function as agents of law enforcement-gathering evidence for prosecution."
AMA, Treatment Versus Criminalization, supra note 12, at 6. The American Society on Ad-
diction Medicine adopted the following policy: "No law or regulation should require physi-
cians to violate confidentiality by reporting their pregnant patients to state or local authorities
for 'prenatal child abuse."' Am. Soe'y on Addiction Medicine, supra note 141, at 6. In addi-
tion, the Southern Regional Project on Infant Mortality takes the position that states should
"[b]ar[- pregnancy related tests and care that reveal substance abuse from being used as evi-
dence in criminal prosecutions." Southern Legislative Summit, supra note 144, at 9.
154. Litigation on behalf of pregnant female prisoners has documented shockingly danger-
ous conditions, including grossly deficient prenatal medical care and nutrition, exposure of
pregnant women to contagious diseases, filthy and overcrowded living conditions, and easy
access to illegal drugs, which have resulted in high rates of miscarriage and infant mortality
and morbidity. See generally Ellen M. Barry, Recent Developments: Pregnant Prisoners, 12
HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 189 (1989); Jacqueline Berrien, Pregnancy & Drug Use: Incarceration is
Not the Answer, RELIGIOUS COALITION FOR ABORTION RTs NEWSL. (Women of Color Part-
nership), Aug. 1989 at 7; AMA, Legal Interventions During Pregnancy, supra note 12, at 2667.
155. As the court stated in Pellegrini, dismissing a special prosecution: "The state's inter-
est would be further undermined when women seek to terminate their pregnancies for fear of
criminal sanctions." Commonwealth v. Pellegrini, No. 87970, slip op. at 9 (Mass. Super. Ct.
Oct. 15, 1990). See also To Stop Abortion by Addict, Her Brother Steps In, supra note 7 at 24
(anti choice group seeking to block abortion by woman incarcerated for "reckless endanger-
ment" of her fetus through her paint sniffing).
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toward their pregnancies: "There is no familiar bond more intimate or
more fundamental than that between the mother and the fetus she carries
in her womb. This court will not permit the destruction of this relation-
ship by the prosecution. .... -156 Finally, adversarial governmental ac-
tions are ineffective in reducing women's drug use during pregnancy
because they fail to address the root problem: the strong physical and
psychological dependencies from which the women suffer.
The same medical, children's welfare, women's rights, and public
policy groups that are unified in their opposition to the adversarial ap-
proach also agree the effective policies are. those that follow a facilitative
model and help women to overcome harmful dependencies.1 5 7 Yet, the
vast majority of pregnant women seeking assistance to overcome drug
dependency cannot obtain the help they need.158 Treatment programs
routinely refuse to admit pregnant women, and those that will typically
have long waiting lists, often longer than the duration of the woman's
pregnancy. 159 A survey of treatment programs in New York City found
that 54% denied treatment to all pregnant women, and 87% said that
they would not treat pregnant women on Medicaid who were dependent
on cocaineb 6° The GAO's 1990 report also found a severe shortage of
treatment programs in key cities throughout the nation.16' Those few
programs that do have space available rarely provide services, such as
prenatal care and child care, to meet the needs of pregnant women. To
be effective and accessible for pregnant women, treatment programs must
provide comprehensive community-based medical, educational, psycho-
logical, and social services. 162 Educational programs designed to dis-
courage the initial use of harmful substances are particularly important.
They serve both to prevent women from developing drug dependencies
that would be difficult to overcome and to avoid harm to fetal develop-
ment that might otherwise occur as a result of a woman's drug use before
156. Pellegrini, slip op. at 16.
157. See supra notes 138-144.
158. Born Hooked: Confronting the Impact of Perinatal Substance Abuse: Hearing Before
the House Select Committee on Children, Youth and Families, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 110, 112
(1989) (statement of Wendy Chavkin, M.D., M.P.H., Rockefeller Fellow, Sergievsky Center,
Columbia University School of Public Health); McNulty, supra note 129 at 301; Wendy K.
Mariner et al., Pregnancy, Drugs, and the Perils of Prosecution, CRIM. JUST. ETHICS, Winter/
Spring 1990, at 30, 36; Katha Pollitt, Fetal Rights. A New Assault on Feminism, THE NATION,
Mar. 26, 1990, at 409; Jane E. Brody, Widespread Abuse of Drugs by Pregnant Women Is
Found, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 1988, at Al.
159. McNulty, supra note 129, at 301-02.
160. Hearing, supra note 158, at 112.
161. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 146, at 36.
162. AMA, Drug Abuse in the United States, supra note 12, at 12-13; Nat'l Ass'n of Pub.
Child Welfare Adm'rs, supra note 12, at 2-3.
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she even knows she is pregnant.1 63 Such programs are also useful in
avoiding unsuccessful birth outcomes attributable to the alteration of
sperm due to drug use by men.16
Although the cost of these needed services clearly is substantial, the
cost of failing to provide them is even greater. As the GAO's report
concluded, financial (and other) costs to society of drug exposed infants
come in many forms: extended and expensive hospital stays at birth for
the infant; subsequent need for special medical care; higher rates of foster
care placement; special educational needs; and limitations on employ-
ment possibilities later in life.165 If the government declines to provide
funding for voluntary treatment programs and as a result women seeking
help are turned away, it is profoundly unjust for the government then to
prosecute, incarcerate, or place in involuntary treatment programs those
same women under legal theories that are deeply threatening to women's
fundamental liberties. As the AMA recognizes, "it would be an injustice
to punish a pregnant woman for not receiving treatment for her sub-
stance abuse when treatment is not an available option to her."'166
Using adversarial approaches to the problem of drug use during
pregnancy when alternative facilitative approaches exist is not only bad
policy, but is also a basis for finding such policies unconstitutional. The
government must seek to serve its interest in the manner least restrictive
of the fundamental rights at stake. As the court concluded in dismissing
the prosecution in Pellegrini, "[t]he commonwealth may effectuate its
stated interest in protecting viable fetuses through less restrictive means,
such as education and making available medical care and drug treatment
centers for pregnant women."1 67
V. Sex and Race Equality Concerns
A. Sex Equality
This article has focused on the threat to women's fundamental right
to liberty posed by governmental policies premised on the adversarial
model. Because such policies burden the liberty only of women, and not
men, adversarial policies also raise important sex equality concerns. The
implications for women's equality recently were touched upon by the
United States Supreme Court when it ruled in Johnson Controls that poli-
163. Am. Soc'y on Addiction Medicine, supra note 141, at 6.
164. See infra notes 171-173 and accompanying text.
165. GEN. AccouNTING OFFICE, supra note 146, at 10.
166. AMA, Legal Interventions During Pregnancy, supra note 12, at 2669.
167. Commonwealth v. Pellegrini, No. 87970, slip op. at 8 (Mass. Super. Ct. Oct. 15,
1990).
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cies that exclude women from jobs presenting risks to fetal development
violate Title VII's prohibition against sex discrimination in
employment. 168
The U.S. Constitution's guarantee of equal protection of the laws,
which protects women from state action that discriminates on the basis
of sex, may provide women with additional protection from adversarial
governmental policies, as may similar provisions of state constitutions.
Under current doctrine, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment prohibits government policies that discriminate on the basis
of sex unless the distinction is "substantially related" to serving "an im-
portant governmental interest."1 69 Although this test is not as rigorous
as the strict scrutiny reserved for race discrimination and policies bur-
dening fundamental rights, it nonetheless provides women with a height-
ened level of judicial protection. Several state courts have interpreted
their state constitutions as providing an even higher level of protection
from sex discrimination than under the federal Constitution.1 70
Although it is beyond the scope of this Article to develop fully an analy-
sis of the constitutional limitations on adversarial policies presented by
the federal guarantee of equal protection, this section will briefly consider
the principal arguments.
Adversarial policies that target only women even though the same
behavior by men also increases the risk of unsuccessful birth outcomes
constitute clear sex discrimination under current equal protection analy-
sis. In such cases, men and women are similarly situated, yet govern-
ment action singles out only women for penalties and restrictions. The
discriminatory employment policy at issue in Johnson Controls is an ex-
ample of such a policy in the private employment context. The policy at
issue excluded only women from jobs involving exposure to lead despite
evidence, as the Supreme Court noted, that men's exposure to lead can
damage their sperm and thus lead to unsuccessful birth outcomes. 171 In
fact, one of the plaintiffs in Johnson Controls was a male employee who
had requested-but been dened-a leave of absence because he hoped to
168. UAW v. Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct. 1196, 1203 (1991).
169. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976); see also Mississippi Univ. for Women v.
Hogan 458 U.S. 718, 724 n.9 (1982) (invalidating sex based classification under intermediate
scrutiny, but stating "we need not decide whether classifications based upon gender are inher-
ently suspect," which would render them subject to strict scrutiny).
170. See, ag., Doe v. Maher, 40 Conn. Supp. 394, 515 A.2d 134, 157-62 (1986) (holding
exclusion of funding for therapeutic abortions from state medicaid program violated state con-
stitutional guarantee of equal protection and state equal rights amendment and discussing
other state court decisions applying strict scrutiny and absolute scrutiny to sex discrimination).
171. Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct. at 1200; see also UAW v. Johnson Controls, 886 F.2d
871, 918-19 (7th Cir. 1989) (en bane) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
March 1992]
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
become a father but wanted first to lower the level of lead in his blood. 172
Adversarial governmental actions directed at women who use drugs and
alcohol during pregnancy represent another context in which only wo-
men have been penalized, despite evidence that alcohol and drug use-as
well as smoking-by men can cause harm to their future children
through the negative effect on sperm.173 Indeed, the relative lack of at-
tention paid to the effects of men's behavior in determining the health of
newborns may itself be a result of impermissible sex stereotypes about
women's role in childbearing.
Establishing a successful equal protection claim will be more com-
plex when the governmental actions restrict behaviors by women that do
not present the same risks to fetal development when engaged in by men.
The application of heightened judicial scrutiny in such cases will depend
on courts recognizing that distinctions based on pregnancy or the poten-
tial to become pregnant are sex based. A controversial 1974 Supreme
Court case, Geduldig v. Aiello, 174 touched on this issue. The Court in
Geduldig upheld California's disability insurance program despite its ex-
clusion of health care related to pregnancy and childbirth from the pro-
gram's coverage. The Court stated that not all pregnancy-related
distinctions necessarily constituted discrimination based on sex and
found that the disability program at issue distinguished not between men
and women but between "pregnant women" and "nonpregnant per-
sons." 175 Soon thereafter, in General Electric v. Gilbert,17 6 the Court ap-
plied the same strained reasoning in defining the scope of Title VII's
prohibition on sex discrimination in employment.177
The Court's decisions in Geduldig and Gilbert have been subjected
to harsh criticism and even ridicule178 for their assertion that a distinc-
tion directly targeting a biological characteristic that only women possess
and thus disadvantaging only women does not constitute a sex based dis-
172. Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct. at 1200. In addition to lead, other workplace toxins that
may damage sperm, and thus increase the risk of cancer and other harm to future children,
include paints, pesticides, chemical solvents, and radiation. Father's Exposure to Toxins Can
Hurt Fetus, Too, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Mar. 9, 1991, at A5.
173. Sandra Blakeslee, Research on Birth Defects Shifts to Flaws in Sperm, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 1, 1991, at Al; Devra L. Davis, Fathers and Fetuses, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 1991, at A27;
Father's Smoking May Damage Sperm, WASH. POST, Jan. 25, 1991, at AS.
174. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
175. Id. at 496 n.20.
176. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
177. See id. at 136.
178. See TRIBE, supra note 59, at 1578 (describing the analysis in Geduldig as "so superfi-
cial as to approach farcical"); Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA.
L. REV. 955, 983-84 nn.107-09 (1984) (citing numerous articles critical of Geduldig).
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tinction. The Court's strained reasoning was immediately rejected by
Congress which overturned Gilbert by amending Title VII to make clear
that, for purposes of employment, discrimination on the basis of preg-
nancy is to be treated as discrimination on the basis of sex. Regardless of
the merits of those decisions, there is good reason to believe that the
Court may not extend its Geduldig reasoning to cover the adversarial
policies discussed in this Article.
When the Court decided Geduldig in 1974, its constitutional juris-
prudence concerning sex discrimination was relatively undeveloped and
unsophisticated. Only one year before, the Court had, for the first time,
ruled that women are a protected class under the Equal Protection
clause.179 The Court's discussion in Geduldig of distinctions based on
pregnancy was brief, confined to a single footnote. Even if Geduldig re-
mains good law, the Court's distinction between "pregnant women" and
"nonpregnant persons" is not applicable or appropriate in the context of
adversarial policies that impose special restrictions on women related to
both current and future childbearing. These adversarial policies threaten
the liberty not only of pregnant women, but of all women. Johnson Con-
trols illustrates the point. There, a private employer excluded not just
pregnant women, but all potentially fertile women from working in high
paying jobs that entailed exposure to lead.
Moreover, the Court is likely only to apply Geduldig in the context
of governmental action extending benefits and not to the type of affirma-
tive penalties, burdens, and obstacles created by adversarial policies.
When evaluating constitutional challenges to policies infringing on wo-
men's reproductive freedom, the Court has distinguished between laws it
views as placing obstacles and burdens on the exercise of fundamental
rights (which are subjected to strict scrutiny), and those that merely fail
to extend benefits (which are reviewed under the deferential rational ba-
sis standard). 180 Indeed, despite the strong criticism leveled at this dis-
tinction, the Court has relied on it as recently as May 1991 to uphold
regulations that were challenged as interfering with the right to privacy
and the right to freedom of expression.18'
The Court's refusal to find unconstitutional sex discrimination in
Geduldig can be seen as reflecting this benefit-burden distinction. In-
deed, in Geduldig, the Court stated that the benefit at issue (health care
related to pregnancy and childcare) involved "a risk that was outside the
179. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (plurality decision).
180. See, eg., Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 509-10 (1989); Harris
v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 315 (1980).
181. Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759, 1772-75 (1991).
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program's protection" and that women in the disability benefit program
already in practice received a higher rate of benefit than men. 182 The
Court explicitly relied on this benefit-burden distinction in the Title VII
context and limited the reach of Gilbert with its decision in Nashville Gas
Co. v. Satty. 183 The Court in Satty distinguished between a disability pol-
icy's failure "to extend to women a benefit that men cannot and do not
receive" and the imposition on women of "a substantial burden that men
need not suffer."184 While Title VII "did not require that greater eco-
nomic benefits be paid to one sex or the other 'because of their differing
roles in "the scheme of human existence"'" an employer could not
"burden female employees in such a way as to deprive them of employ-
ment opportunities because of their different role."185 Geduldig thus is
unlikely to be applied to adversarial policies that involve not the exten-
sion of benefits, but the imposition of affirmative burdens and special
penalties on women.
Finally, adversarial policies that impose restrictions on women's be-
havior only because of their childbearing capacity should be subjected to
heightened scrutiny because they constitute a government policy to cre-
ate a separate regime of onerous legal restrictions and obligations only
for women. As many have argued, the core value behind the Equal Pro-
tection Clause that necessitates heightened scrutiny of governmental dis-
tinctions on the basis of race or sex is a concern that the government not
use its power to relegate any identifiable group to an inferior position in
society.186 Historically, the "justification" offered for the laws and poli-
cies that have functioned most insidiously in relegating women to an in-
ferior status has been that the limitations placed on women's actions and
freedom served women's unique role in childbearing. The Supreme
Court noted this in Johnson Controls: "Concern for a woman's existing
or potential offspring historically has been the excuse for denying women
equal employment opportunities."' 187 On this basis, women were re-
182. Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 497 & n.21. The Court similarly based its ruling on the lack of
evidence "that the selection of the risks insured by the program worked to discriminate against
any definable group or class in terms of the aggregate risk protection derived by that group or
class from the program." Id. at 496.
183. 434 U.S. 136 (1977).
184. Id. at 142. But see TRIBE, supra note 59, at 1579 (agreeing with Justice Stevens'
assertion that the distinction is "at best problematic").
185. Satty, 434 U.S. at 142.
186. See TRIBE, supra note 59, at 1465 ("The central concern has been to root out any
action by government which, in Justice Stone's phrase is tainted by 'prejudice against discrete
and insular minorities'...."); Paul R. Dimond, The Anti-Caste Principle-Toward a Constitu-
tional Standard for Review of Race Cases, 30 WAYNE L. REv. 1, 2-3 (1983).
187. UAW v. Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct. 1196, 1210 (1991).
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stricted in the hours they could work in paid employment, 88 excluded
from political and civic affairs, 189 and barred from certain professions,
such as the practice of the law. 190
Although the current use of adversarial policies, such as those that
exclude fertile women from high-paying jobs because of potential harm
to potential fetuses, may be more subtle than the exclusionary policies of
a century ago, the core justification is the same: Women's job opportuni-
ties and other liberties are restricted because someone other than the wo-
man herself has decided that her childbearing role should be paramount.
Indeed, it is difficult to distinguish between the rationale offered by pro-
ponents of adversarial policies today and the now-discredited 1908 opin-
ion in which the Supreme Court upheld restrictions on women's ability
to work in paid employment as necessary to promote the birth of healthy
babies: "as healthy mothers are essential to vigorous offspring, the physi-
cal well being of woman becomes an object of public interest and care in
order to preserve the strength and vigor of the race."' 19 1
History thus counsels that it is precisely when the government
targets women for disadvantageous treatment because of their childbear-
ing capacity that courts should be most suspicious and therefore apply
heightened scrutiny to the governmental action. Unless required to pro-
vide a compelling justification for pregnancy-related restrictions on wo-
men, not all legislatures, prosecutors, and judges will adequately value
the range of women's interests and needs, and most important, their right
to make those value judgments themselves.
B. Racial Equality
The manner in which the government has pursued adversarial poli-
cies also raises serious concerns regarding racial justice, from both a pol-
icy and a constitutional perspective. The data that exist as to the race of
the women against whom the government has taken adversarial action
reveal that the vast majority have been African American women and
other women of color. Although, as mentioned above, this Article does
not seek to provide a thorough equal protection analysis of adversarial
policies, the compelling evidence outlined below that such policies have
been administered in a racially discriminatory manner hopefully will
188. E.g., Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
189. E.g., Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 61-62 (1961) (women exempted from mandatory
jury duty); Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277, 282 (1937) (women who did not vote exempted
from poll tax).
190. E.g., Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872) (excluding women from prac-
tice of law not unconstitutional).
191. Muller, 208 U.S. at 421; see Pollitt, supra note 158, at 409.
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serve as an invitation to others to develop fully the constitutional and
public policy analysis this critical issue deserves. 192
In 1987, the New England Journal of Medicine published the results
of a national survey of obstetricians concerning the scope and circum-
stances of court-ordered obstetrical interventions during the preceding
five years.193 The study uncovered twenty-one instances in which court
orders were sought for cesarean sections, hospital detentions, or in-
trauterine transfusions. Among the information requested was the race
of the woman against whom the court order was sought. Seventeen of
the twenty-one women involved, or 81%, were women of color. Court
orders for cesarean sections were sought in fifteen instances; thirteen
were obtained. Eighty percent (twelve) of the women were African
American or Asian, and only 20% (three) were white. Two of the three
cases in which hospital detentions were sought involved African Ameri-
can women. Of the three women against whom court orders for in-
trauterine transfusions were sought, two were African American and one
was Hispanic. 194
Equally skewed on racial lines are the findings in studies of women
who have been the targets of special criminal prosecutions carrying har-
sher penalties because they used illegal drugs during pregnancy. An arti-
cle published in 1990, also in the New England Journal of Medicine,
reports the results of a six month study of women seeking prenatal care
at five public health clinics and twelve private obstetrical offices in Pinel-
las County, Florida.195 Florida is one of several states that require the
reporting by health officials of the birth of infants to women suspected of
using drugs or alcohol during pregnancy. The study found that 14.8% of
women tested positive for drugs or alcohol and 13.3% of women tested
positive for illicit drugs. 196
The rate of positive toxicologies for drug and alcohol use among
white women was slightly higher, 15.4%, than it was for African Ameri-
can women, 14.1%, with African American women more likely to test
positive for cocaine and white women more likely to test positive for ma-
192. See Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of Color,
Equality, and the Right of Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REv. 1419, 1426 (1991) (excellent discussion
of the prosecution of drug-dependent women who bear children from a perspective "that com-
bines elements of racial equality and privacy theories in advocating the reproductive rights of
women of color").
193. Kolder et al., supra note 9.
194. Id. at 1192-93.
195. Ira J. Chasnoff et al., The Prevalence of Illicit-Drug or Alcohol Use During Pregnancy
and Discrepancies in Mandatory Reporting in Pinellas County, Florida, 322 NEw ENG. J. MED.
1202 (1990).
196. Id. at 1204.
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rijuana. Despite the slightly higher rate for white women and the legal
requirement that suspected drug and alcohol use be reported, the study
found that the rate at which African American women were reported to
the health authorities was approximately ten times the rate for white wo-
men. The proportion of white women reported was 1.1%, while the pro-
portion of African American women reported was 10.7%.197
A 1990 national survey by the American Civil Liberties Union of
women who have been criminally prosecuted for behavior during preg-
nancy found similar results. 198 The survey documented fifty criminal
prosecutions, all but two of which occurred in the preceding two years
and the vast majority of which involved the use of illicit drugs during
pregnancy. Of the forty-seven cases in which the race of the women
could be identified, 80% of the prosecutions had been brought against
women of color. 199
VI. Conclusion
One of the most harmful consequences of the use of adversarial poli-
cies is that it creates a false impression that an inherent conflict exists
between promoting healthy births and protecting women's fundamental
liberties. This may mislead policymakers and courts into believing that
they must make tradeoffs between the important governmental objectives
of protecting women's rights and improving maternal and infant health.
Yet this apparent conflict in fact is no conflict at all. Although govern-
mental use of adversarial policies may create the impression that action is
being taken to deter behavior by women that causes unhealthy births, in
reality such policies have the effect not only of infringing on women's
liberty but also of deterring the types of behavior necessary for healthy
and safe pregnancies.
Policymakers who truly wish to foster healthy childbearing must
understand that government, women, and their future children all have
shared interests in taking the steps necessary to promote healthy births.
They also must recognize that imposing special penalties that restrict the
capacity of women to control their lives will not further these shared
interests. Rather, the government must take positive steps to remove ob-
stacles that prevent women from receiving the health services, treatment,
and prenatal care they need. This is the core concept behind the facilita-
tive model. Only by embracing it can earnest policymakers work effec-
197. Id. at 1204-05.
198. See ACLU Memorandum, supra note 4, at 1-2.
199. Id. at 2.
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tively to ensure that every child has the best possible chance of being
born healthy.
